







Finding the Best Fit: Exploring Postsecondary Undermatch in Tennessee 
by 
Emily A. House 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Educational Studies) 












Professor Brian P. McCall, Chair 
Professor Michael N. Bastedo 
Professor Stephen L. DesJardins 
Professor Jeffrey A. Smith
 ii 
Dedication 




First and foremost, thank you to my committee – Brian McCall, Steve DesJardins, Mike 
Bastedo and Jeff Smith – for your patience, kindness and guidance. Brian, your quiet genius is an 
inspiration. Thank you for sharing a little bit of it with me. Steve, you are the world’s greatest 
advocate and mentor, and I am honored to call you an advisor, friend, and colleague. To Mike, 
thank you for welcoming me into the CSHPE family, and to Jeff, my appreciation for your 
warmth and humor cannot be overstated. 
Many thanks to the Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC) and the Tennessee 
Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC) for allowing me to use data from their Student 
Information Systems for this dissertation.  
To my colleagues at THEC and TSAC, who have become my professional family: to 
Russ Deaton, for a life-changing conversation in a parking lot in February 2008. To David 
Wright, for your friendship, candor, and for bringing me back to THEC when I really needed to 
be here. And to Richard Rhoda, my forever boss, for your wisdom, kindness, and hundreds of 
cups of Starbucks coffee. I am indebted to the three of you more than I can express. Many thanks 
to Mike Krause, Pete Abernathy, Tim Phelps, Jason Cavender, O.W. Higley, and Scott Sloan for 
your support and advocacy, and for introducing me as “Doctor House” well before you should 
have. Many thank yous and many hugs to my brilliant research team: Alex Gorbunov, Brian 
Douglas, Amanda Klafehn, Madison Dell, Crystal Collins, Steven Gentile, and Taylor Odle – for 
your patience, flexibility, and for giving me the space to tackle this massive task. And to Kate
 iv 
Derrick, for every pep talk, hallway dance party, late night at the office, and trip to Dunkin’ 
Donuts.  
To my in-the-trenches Michigan friends, for your encouragement and camaraderie: 
Allyson Flaster, Inger Bergom, Joanna Frye, Linda Rayle, Melinda Richardson, Sarah Fick, Kim 
Lijana, Rosie Perez, Tom and Mandy McGuinness, Chris Nellum, Noe Ortega, Josh Hyman, 
Caroline Theoharides, Jess Wiederspan and Joe Waddington. A very heartfelt thank you to my 
best girl and graduate school soul mate, Monica Bhatt. You are the only one who really knows. I 
cannot begin to adequately thank Mark Wiederspan, my “work husband,” who inspires me each 
day. I would not have made it through this program without you. 
To my family, especially my mother, Annemarie House, who never once doubted that I 
would reach this milestone, and who is the only person I want to be when I grow up. Thank you 
for being the voice on the other end of the phone when I am happy, sad, ecstatic or exasperated.  
And finally, a million thanks to my husband Mike Gabrys, who has been an important 
part of this journey from the beginning. For your love and grace, for every time you walked the 
dog, cooked dinner, and didn’t complain when I worked late or holed myself up in my office. 






Table of Contents 
Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. ix 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. x 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... xi 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Higher Education in Tennessee .......................................................... 1 
What is Undermatch? .................................................................................................................. 2 
Significance of the Study ............................................................................................................ 3 
Organization of Dissertation ....................................................................................................... 4 
Higher Education in Tennessee ................................................................................................... 6 
Public Institutions .................................................................................................................... 6 
Private Institutions ................................................................................................................... 8 
Higher Education Enrollment .................................................................................................. 9 
Student Demographics ............................................................................................................. 9 
Student academic characteristics ........................................................................................... 10 
Barron’s selectivity rankings ................................................................................................. 10 
Tuition and Fees .................................................................................................................... 11 
Institutional Resources .......................................................................................................... 11 
Regional Comparison ............................................................................................................ 12 
Higher Education Innovation in Tennessee ........................................................................... 12 
References ................................................................................................................................. 16 
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Frameworks .......................................................... 35 
Literature Review ...................................................................................................................... 35 
Prevalence of Undermatch ..................................................................................................... 35 
Contributors to Undermatch .................................................................................................. 36 
Consequences of Undermatch ............................................................................................... 39 
Statewide Merit Aid Programs and Undermatch ................................................................... 43 
Place-Based Tuition-Free College Initiatives and Undermatch ............................................ 44 
Limitations of Prior Literature ............................................................................................... 45 
 vi 
Theoretical Frameworks ............................................................................................................ 46 
Human Capital Theory .......................................................................................................... 47 
Hossler and Gallagher’s (1987) College Choice Model ........................................................ 49 
Perna’s (2006) College Choice Model .................................................................................. 53 
Counterfactual theory ............................................................................................................ 55 
References ................................................................................................................................. 57 
Chapter 3 The Effect of Multiple Definitions on Undermatch Rates in Tennessee ..................... 64 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 64 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 65 
Postsecondary undermatch definition .................................................................................... 65 
Prevalence of postsecondary undermatch in the United States ............................................. 65 
Contributors to undermatch ................................................................................................... 65 
Consequences of undermatch ................................................................................................ 66 
Contribution and Research Questions ....................................................................................... 67 
Definitions of Undermatch ........................................................................................................ 68 
Roderick et al. (2009) ............................................................................................................ 68 
Bowen, et al. (2009) .............................................................................................................. 69 
Barron’s selectivity categories ............................................................................................... 69 
Distance from mean GPA and ACT ...................................................................................... 70 
Dillon and Smith (2017) ........................................................................................................ 70 
Data ........................................................................................................................................... 71 
Sample ....................................................................................................................................... 72 
Findings ..................................................................................................................................... 73 
Roderick et al. (2009) ............................................................................................................ 73 
Bowen et al. (2009) ............................................................................................................... 74 
Barron’s selectivity categories ............................................................................................... 74 
Distance from mean GPA and ACT ...................................................................................... 75 
Dillon and Smith (2017) ........................................................................................................ 76 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 77 
Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 79 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 80 
References ................................................................................................................................. 81 
Chapter 4 Matching the Best and Brightest to the Best Institutions? The Effects of the General 
Assembly Merit Scholarship (GAMS) Program on Undermatch ..................................... 88 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 88 
 vii 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 89 
Contribution and Research Questions ....................................................................................... 90 
Prior Literature .......................................................................................................................... 91 
Bruce and Carruthers (2014) ................................................................................................. 91 
Cohodes and Goodman (2014) .............................................................................................. 92 
Program Description: Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship ............................................. 92 
Program history ..................................................................................................................... 92 
Scholarship types ................................................................................................................... 93 
Data ........................................................................................................................................... 95 
Sample ....................................................................................................................................... 96 
Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 97 
Estimation .............................................................................................................................. 98 
Definitions of undermatch ....................................................................................................... 100 
Results ..................................................................................................................................... 101 
Four most selective institutions ........................................................................................... 101 
Subgroup treatment effects .................................................................................................. 102 
Dillon and Smith (2017) ...................................................................................................... 103 
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 104 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 105 
References ............................................................................................................................... 108 
Chapter 5 Free at What Cost? The Effects of Tennessee Achieves on Undermatch .................. 119 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................... 119 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 120 
Carruthers and Fox (2016) ................................................................................................... 121 
Contribution and research questions ....................................................................................... 121 
Program description: Tennessee Achieves .............................................................................. 123 
Data ......................................................................................................................................... 124 
Sample ..................................................................................................................................... 125 
Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 127 
Difference-in-differences ..................................................................................................... 127 
Propensity score matching ................................................................................................... 128 
Definitions of undermatch ....................................................................................................... 131 
Results ..................................................................................................................................... 131 
Difference-in-differences ..................................................................................................... 132 
 viii 
Propensity score matching ................................................................................................... 134 
Directions for future research .................................................................................................. 137 
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 138 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 138 
References ............................................................................................................................... 141 
Chapter 6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 149 
Contribution to literature ......................................................................................................... 150 
Theoretical frameworks........................................................................................................... 151 
Human capital theory ........................................................................................................... 151 
College choice models ......................................................................................................... 152 
Implications for policy ............................................................................................................ 153 
Undermatch in Tennessee .................................................................................................... 153 
GAMS program ................................................................................................................... 154 
Tennessee Achieves (Tennessee Promise) .......................................................................... 155 
Directions for future research .................................................................................................. 156 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 157 
References ............................................................................................................................... 159 
  
 ix 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1. Per pupil instructional spending at private institutions, 2010-2013 ............................ 24 
Table 1.2. Per pupil instructional spending at public 2-year institutions, 2010-2013 .................. 25 
Table 1.3. Per pupil instructional spending at public 4-year institutions, 2010-2013 .................. 26 
Table 1.4. Per pupil instructional spending at colleges of applied technology, 2010-2013 ......... 27 
Table 1.5. Per pupil student services spending at private institutions, 2010-2013 ....................... 28 
Table 1.6. Per pupil student services spending at public 2-year institutions, 2010-2013 ............. 29 
Table 1.7. Per pupil student services spending at public 4-year institutions, 2010-2013 ............. 30 
Table 1.8. Per pupil student services spending at colleges of applied technology, 2010-2013 .... 31 
Table 1.9. Per pupil academic support spending at private institutions, 2010-2013 .................... 32 
Table 1.10. Per pupil academic support spending at public 2-year institutions, 2010-2013 ........ 33 
Table 1.11. Per pupil academic support spending at public 4-year institutions, 2010-2013 ........ 34 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics – Recent High School Graduates in Tennessee ........................ 84 
Table 3.2. Rates of Undermatch Among Recent High School Graduates, by definition ............. 85 
Table 3.3 Categories for Access to Institution Types, by ACT and High School GPA ............... 86 
Table 3.4 Description of Institution Selectivity Groupings and Rankings ................................... 87 
Table 4.1. Criteria for TELS award receipt, 2009-2014 ............................................................. 110 
Table 4.2. Sample descriptive statistics, by TELS award type ................................................... 111 
Table 4.3. OLS and Parametric effects of GAMS receipt on likelihood of undermatch: Attending 
Top 4 Institutions in Tennessee ...................................................................................... 115 
Table 4.4. OLS and Parametric effects of GAMS receipt on likelihood of undermatch: Dillon and 
Smith (2017) ................................................................................................................... 116 
Table 4.5. Nonparametric effects of GAMS receipt on likelihood of undermatch, by definition of 
undermatch ...................................................................................................................... 117 
Table 4.6. Robustness checks to confirm quadratic model specification ................................... 118 
Table 5.1. Tennessee Achieves implementation and neighboring (untreated) counties ............. 144 
Table 5.2. Sample descriptive statistics – post-Tennessee Achieves implementation ............... 145 
Table 5.3. County-level unemployment, attainment, and presence of two-year institutions...... 146
Table 5.4. Difference-in-differences: Effect of Tennessee Achieves on undermatch ................ 147 
Table 5.5. Propensity score matching results: Tennessee Achieves participation and probability 
of undermatch ................................................................................................................. 148 
 x 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1. Public higher education governance in Tennessee ..................................................... 18 
Figure 1.2. Universities governed by the University of Tennessee system .................................. 19 
Figure 1.3. Universities governed by the Tennessee Board of Regents ....................................... 20 
Figure 1.4. Community colleges governed by the Tennessee Board of Regents ......................... 21 
Figure 1.5. Technical colleges (TCATs) governed by the Tennessee Board of Regents ............. 22 
Figure 4.1. ACT Composite Score Distribution ......................................................................... 112 
Figure 4.2. Likelihood of GAMS receipt, by ACT score ........................................................... 113 
Figure 4.3. Sorting at the ACT discontinuity (McCrary density test) ........................................ 114 




This dissertation explores the prevalence of postsecondary undermatch among recent 
high school graduates in Tennessee. Postsecondary undermatch occurs when high achieving 
students choose to attend colleges or universities that are less selective or of lower quality than 
those at which they are academically eligible to enroll. Using student-level data provided by the 
Tennessee Higher Education Commission and the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, I 
first investigate variation in undermatch rates when employing different definitions of 
undermatch. I then examine the effects of two state-sponsored financial aid programs on treated 
students’ probabilities of undermatch across the state. Implications for policy and directions for 
future research are presented at length.   
The opinions and findings discussed in this study do not represent the opinions of the 
Tennessee Higher Education Commission, the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, 




Introduction and Higher Education in Tennessee 
Over the past decade, groundbreaking public policy has transformed higher education in 
Tennessee. Under the leadership of two education-focused governors and a supportive 
legislature, the state has introduced a number of innovative higher education initiatives. These 
include, among others, a lottery-funded merit- and need-based scholarship program, an 
outcomes-based funding formula that allocates one hundred percent of higher education 
appropriations on the basis of student success, an ambitious statewide postsecondary completion 
and workforce alignment goal, and a well-publicized initiative to provide tuition-free community 
and technical college to recent high school graduates (Tennessee Higher Education Commission 
[THEC], 2015). This suite of policies and programs aims to improve access and affordability in 
higher education, as well as incentivize institutions to support, retain, and graduate their students.  
More specifically, one of the stated objectives of both the Tennessee Education Lottery 
Scholarship (TELS) program and the Tennessee Promise, the free community and technical 
college program, is to encourage those who would not have otherwise pursued postsecondary 
education to do so (THEC, 2016a). What has been largely ignored in discussions of these 
initiatives, however, is another group of students: those who would have enrolled in higher 
education in the absence of these programs, but make different enrollment decisions in light of 
their availability. For example, students may choose to attend less selective institutions as a
result of the TELS and Tennessee Promise programs, raising questions about postsecondary 
undermatch as a result of these initiatives.
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What is Undermatch? 
Postsecondary undermatch, broadly defined, occurs when a student chooses to attend a 
college or university at which he is academically overqualified relative to other students enrolled 
at that institution (Black & Smith, 2004, 2006; Roderick, Nagaoka, Coca, & Moeller, 2008, 
2009; Bowen, Chingos & McPherson, 2009; Dillon & Smith, 2017; Smith, Pender, & Howell, 
2013). The academic measures most commonly used to determine whether a student is 
appropriately matched to the institution he attends are his high school grade point average (GPA) 
and composite standardized test score (ACT or SAT).  
Many education researchers and policymakers are concerned about undermatch, as this 
phenomenon results in highly qualified students enrolling in less selective, lower quality higher 
education institutions. These institutions often provide fewer resources per student, have lower 
graduation rates, and the workforce outcomes of graduates are less favorable than those of 
students who graduate from more selective institutions (Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner, 2012; 
Bowen, et al., 2009; Hoekstra, 2009; Reynolds, 2012). Further, undermatch is often reflective of 
a deficit in students’ college search, application and enrollment processes (Roderick, et al., 2008, 
2009). Student groups that typically struggle with these processes - first generation, nonwhite, 
and lower income students – are those who most often undermatch, often reducing their access to 
high quality higher education (Fry, 2002; Alon & Tienda, 2003; Bowen, et al., 2009; Roderick, 
et al., 2008, 2009; Smith et al., 2013).  
Much of the existing literature investigating undermatch is lacking on a number of 
dimensions. First, each author employs a unique definition of what it means to undermatch. 
These definitions are often a result of data availability and/or the author’s specific research 
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questions. For this reason, findings related to the prevalence of undermatch are often not 
comparable between different studies, and are sometimes not generalizable to states, cities, or 
institutions other than those included in a particular sample. Second, undermatch is often 
explored at the individual level (i.e., college-going decisions of individual students or particular 
subgroups of students) and is rarely investigated in light of policies and programs at the state-, 
city-, system- or institution-levels. As such, undermatch is often explored in a vacuum, without 
regard for unique higher education contexts and state and institutional policies that may impact 
enrollment decisions. 
Significance of the Study 
This dissertation will first explore the various definitions of undermatch employed in 
prior research, and the impact of these different definitions on conclusions about undermatch in 
Tennessee. I will then investigate the effects of two higher education initiatives – the General 
Assembly Merit Scholarship (GAMS – one of three programs that comprise the Tennessee 
Education Lottery Scholarship program) and Tennessee Achieves, the regional precursor to the 
statewide Tennessee Promise tuition- and fee-free community and technical college program – 
on student match.  
Merit aid programs and tuition-free community college initiatives are extremely relevant 
to policy discussions and empirical investigations of undermatch. State-sponsored merit aid 
programs often have strict parameters around the institutions at which scholarships may be used 
(i.e., in-state, public versus private institutions), and the buying power of the awards at different 
institution types (i.e., a community college versus a four-year university) may vary substantially. 
For this reason, students may choose to remain in-state rather than search nationally for a 
postsecondary option that is the best match, or attend an institution at which the merit aid can 
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most discount tuition, leading to increased undermatch. Further, as tuition-free community 
college programs are becoming popular policy proposals, there is great concern among educators 
and policymakers that these initiatives may result in increased undermatch among high achieving 
students.  These programs are often widely publicized, and may incentivize students to enroll at a 
less-than-four year institution at which they are undermatched relative to their peers, such that 
they may take advantage of the “free” college option.  
These analyses provide guidance to future researchers about the importance of using 
explicit definitions when discussing undermatch, as well as the impact of large scale, high-
publicity higher education initiatives on undermatch. The findings of these papers should 
encourage more explicit conversations about measuring undermatch, and about how large-scale 
programs may affect this phenomenon.  
Organization of Dissertation 
Following this introduction, Chapter 1 discusses the higher education context in 
Tennessee. This chapter describes and maps where higher education institutions are located, 
outlines how public higher education is funded and governed, outlines the role of private 
institutions in state-level policymaking and implementation, and describes the demographic, 
socioeconomic and academic characteristics of students in Tennessee. This chapter also 
discusses tuition, fees, and cost of attendance, as well as resources available to students (i.e., per 
pupil spending) at each institution across the state. 
Chapter 2 reviews prior literature and presents the theoretical frameworks that moor this 
dissertation. Prior literature investigating undermatch discusses the college search and 
application processes, student decision-making about enrollment, and the returns to attending 
and earning a degree from a more selective or higher quality institution. This chapter also 
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includes a review of literature discussing statewide merit aid programs, the success of place-
based financial aid programs and the “community college penalty,” topics related to the 
Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship and Tennessee Achieves programs explored in 
Chapters 4 and 5. In addition, two theoretical frameworks, human capital theory (i.e., Becker, 
1993) and theories of college choice (i.e., Hossler & Gallagher, 1987; Perna, 2006) will be 
presented at length, as they are the theories that anchor this work. This chapter concludes by 
discussing counterfactual theories of causation (i.e., Lewis, 1973). 
Chapter 3 applies five definitions of undermatch used in prior research to a sample of 
first-year students entering higher education in Tennessee. Using data from the Tennessee 
Higher Education Commission Student Information System (THEC SIS) and the National 
Student Clearinghouse (NSC), this chapter demonstrates that the measured prevalence of 
undermatch in a given geography (i.e., the state of Tennessee) is a direct result of how 
undermatch is defined.  
Chapter 4 investigates undermatch as a result of the General Assembly Merit Scholarship 
(GAMS) program. Whereas merit aid programs have been researched at length, there is a dearth 
of literature directly addressing whether such programs contribute to undermatch. This paper 
employs student-level data from the THEC SIS and the Tennessee Student Assistance 
Corporation (TSAC), Tennessee’s state granting agency, to determine whether students enroll in 
more or less selective institutions as a result of receiving a GAMS award. I hypothesize, 
consistent with findings of Cohodes and Goodman (2014), that these high-achieving GAMS 
recipients will attend lower quality institutions, as compared to their peers who receive a 
different, lesser merit-based award.
1
 Following the model of Bruce and Carruthers (2014), I 
                                                             
1
 The structure of the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter 4. 
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employ a sharp regression discontinuity approach to explore the enrollment behavior of those 
who receive a GAMS award compared to those who do not.  
 Chapter 5 explores undermatch in light of a more recent county-level initiative: 
Tennessee Achieves, a tuition- and fee-free community and technical college program that 
served as the model for Governor Bill Haslam’s widely publicized Tennessee Promise program. 
Although thousands of students have participated in Tennessee Achieves since 2009, it is unclear 
whether this program resulted in students attending a community or technical college in lieu of a 
four-year institution at which they would have been a better academic match. I hypothesize that 
students in treated counties enroll at community and technical colleges at higher rates than 
neighboring, untreated counties as a result of Tennessee Achieves, but that they are substituting 
away from less selective four-year institutions that enroll students with low academic 
qualifications. This paper will use data provided by the THEC SIS and from Tennessee 
Achieves, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit which coordinated the county-level program prior to its 
statewide implementation. I employ difference-in-differences and propensity score matching 
methodologies to explore the impact of this program on undermatch rates in the three largest of 
the 27 Tennessee Achieves counties.  
In conclusion, Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the previous three chapters, and 
outlines directions for future research about undermatch, both in Tennessee and throughout the 
United States.  
Higher Education in Tennessee 
Public Institutions 
Public higher education in Tennessee is comprised of fifty universities, community 
colleges, and colleges of applied technology across the state (Tennessee Higher Education 
Commission [THEC], 2016a). These institutions are governed by two boards: the University of 
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Tennessee Board of Trustees (UT) and the Tennessee Board of Regents (TBR). These two 
systems, which have governing authority over these institutions, are overseen by the Tennessee 
Higher Education Commission (THEC), the state’s coordinating board established in 1967 with 
the mission to “achieve coordination and foster unity” among the two systems of higher 
education in Tennessee (THEC, 2015). For example, THEC approves capital projects from 
ranked lists provided by the systems, approves new academic programs to minimize duplication 
across institutions, and provides recommendations each year related to increases in tuition and 
fees (THEC, 2015). As of 2012, the executive director of THEC is appointed by the Governor of 
Tennessee, and the agency reports to the state’s Executive and Legislative branches. Figure 1.1 
presents graphically the coordinating and governance structure of public higher education in 
Tennessee.  
The University of Tennessee (UT) system in comprised of four institutions across the 
state. The University of Tennessee at Knoxville is the system’s flagship campus, and is one of 
Tennessee’s two land grant institutions. The Universities of Tennessee at Chattanooga and 
Martin are regional campuses, both serving a student body that is more racially, 
socioeconomically, and academically diverse than that of the University of Tennessee at 
Knoxville. The University of Tennessee Health Science Center is located in Memphis. This 
institution trains health and medical professionals, and offers primarily post-baccalaureate 
degrees. A map of UT institutions is presented in Figure 1.2.  
The Tennessee Board of Regents (TBR) governs six universities, thirteen community 
colleges, and 27 colleges of applied technology (TCATs). Relative to the UT system, TBR 
institutions have more comprehensive and teaching-oriented missions, admitting students with 
lower academic qualifications and/or those who intend to pursue more technical careers. 
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Community and technical colleges in Tennessee are open admission, within the bounds of 
program capacity (THEC, 2015). A map of the universities governed by the Tennessee Board of 
Regents is provided in Figure 1.3. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 present maps of community colleges and 
technical colleges governed by the Tennessee Board of Regents, respectively.  
There is a substantial difference in the academic characteristics of students, available 
resources, and completion rates among public higher education institutions in Tennessee. This is 
true not only between (i.e. two-year colleges versus four-year universities) but also within (i.e., 
the 13 community colleges across the state) institution types. For example, Southwest Tennessee 
Community College, which is the state’s largest community college and serves students in 
Memphis, has an average freshmen ACT score of 16, and a 13 percent six-year graduation rate 
(THEC, 2016a). Students at Pellissippi State Community College, which serves the Knoxville 
metropolitan area, have an average entering ACT score of 20 (higher than the state average of 
19) and graduate at a rate greater than 30 percent. Pellissippi State Community College also 
boasts the highest rate of transfer from any community college to the University of Tennessee at 
Knoxville, the state’s flagship public university (THEC, 2016a). This variation in quality among 
community colleges, particularly along geographic lines is concerning, as Tennessee now offers 
students the opportunity to attend community college tuition-free.  
Private Institutions 
Private colleges and universities are not overseen by THEC or either governing body. 
These institutions participate voluntarily in the Tennessee Independent Colleges and Universities 
Association (TICUA). TICUA engages with 34 private institutions around public policy issues, 
cost containment, and professional development opportunities for administrators, faculty, and 
staff. TICUA interacts with the General Assembly on behalf of many of its member institutions, 
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and serves as a data clearinghouse for all mandated federal and state reporting (TICUA, 2015). 
TICUA institutions are two- and four-year institutions, and degree offerings range from 
associate’s to doctoral and professional degrees. All regionally accredited, not-for-profit private 
institutions in Tennessee but one (a small college in Nashville that specializes in mortuary 
science) participate in TICUA (TICUA, 2015). A map of TICUA institutions is presented in 
Figure 1.6.  
Higher Education Enrollment 
Approximately 393,000 students were enrolled in higher education in Tennessee in Fall 
2015. Of these students, 34 percent attend a public four-year institution in Tennessee (governed 
by the UT or TBR systems), 27 percent attend less-than-four year institutions in Tennessee 
(community colleges and TCATs), and 21 percent enroll in private institutions in-state. The 
remaining students enroll out-of-state or at private, for-profit institutions (THEC, 2016a). In 
2015, approximately 62 percent of high school graduates in Tennessee enrolled in higher 
education immediately following high school graduation. This percentage (Tennessee’s college-
going rate) reflects an increase of 4.6 percentage points over the high school class of 2014, due 
in part to implementation of the Tennessee Promise, Tennessee’s tuition-free community and 
technical college program (THEC, 2016a).  Despite this increase, Tennessee remains below the 
national college-going rate (68 percent) and has a much lower college-going rate than some of its 
peer states in the Southeast (i.e., Georgia and Mississippi).  
Student Demographics  
The vast majority of students – approximately 70 percent - who participate in higher 
education in Tennessee are white. African American students comprise 17.8 percent of the 
statewide student body, while Hispanic students make up 3.8 percent. Students of color are 
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overrepresented at community and technical colleges, and at less selective four-year institutions 
(THEC, 2016a). Less than half (41 percent) of students enrolled in higher education in Tennessee 
are low income.
2
 The majority of undergraduate students are under 25 years of age (75.1 
percent); non-traditional age students are overrepresented at less-than-four year institutions. 




The average ACT composite score for first-time freshmen in Tennessee, across all 
systems and institution types, is a 19.0 (ACT, 2015). For those enrolled in community colleges, 
the mean ACT composite score is 18.8; it is 21.2 for first-time freshmen enrolled at public and 
private universities (THEC, 2016a). ACT scores vary dramatically by institution: the mean ACT 
Composite score at Vanderbilt University, for example, is 33; it is 26.2 at the University of 
Tennessee at Knoxville and 16.6 at Southwest Tennessee Community College, an open 
admission institution in Memphis (THEC, 2016a; TICUA, 2015).  
Barron’s selectivity rankings 
The most selective higher education institutions in Tennessee, per the Barron’s selectivity 
rankings, are Vanderbilt University, Rhodes College, Sewanee, the University of the South, and 
the University of Tennessee at Knoxville.
4
 Three of these institutions are private (Vanderbilt, 
Rhodes, and Sewanee) and one is public (University of Tennessee at Knoxville). These four 
institutions are classified by Barron’s as Most (Vanderbilt), Highly (Rhodes and Sewanee), or 
Very Competitive (University of Tennessee at Knoxville) based on their admission rates and the 
                                                             
2
 Low income is defined as a student who is/was ever Pell eligible. 
3
 Students’ high school grade point averages (GPAs) are complete and reliable in the THEC 
Student Information System (THEC SIS) only for those students receiving Tennessee Education 
Lottery Scholarship (TELS) awards. For this reason, this variable is not often used to describe 
the academic achievement of the population of students enrolled in Tennessee.   
4
 These institutions’ Barron’s Selectivity Rankings are relevant to Chapter 3, which investigates 
the impacts of different definitions of undermatch.  
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ACT Composite scores of admitted first-year students (Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2008). 
All other public and private four-year institutions are ranked as Competitive or Less Competitive 
(Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2008). Less-than-four year institutions (community and 
technical colleges) in Tennessee are open admission, and are therefore not ranked by Barron’s. 
Tuition and Fees 
Average in-state tuition and fees (sticker price) for Tennessee residents enrolled at a 
public four-year institution in 2015 was $8,690, ranging from $7,417 at Tennessee State 
University to $11,948 at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (THEC, 2016a). Average 
tuition and fees at community and technical colleges in Fall 2015 was $4,121 and $3,554, 
respectively (THEC, 2016a). Tuition and fees have increased over time: over the past five years, 
average tuition across all public institutions increased by approximately 35 percent; over the past 
decade, the increase is closer to 90 percent (THEC, 2016a). This is due in part to diminishing 
state appropriations to higher education in Tennessee.  
Annual tuition and fees vary greatly across private institutions – from approximately 
$15,000 at many small private colleges to approximately $50,000 at Vanderbilt University, the 
most expensive institution in the state (TICUA, 2015). 
Institutional Resources 
Tables 1.1 through 1.11 contains per pupil instructional spending, academic support 
spending, and student services spending at each public and private institution in Tennessee.
5
 Per 
pupil spending in each of these three categories varies substantially both between and within 
institution types. In general, two-year institutions (community and technical colleges) spend 
much less per student in each of these areas than public and private four-year institutions. 
                                                             
5
 Colleges of Applied Technology in Tennessee (TCATs) do not report academic support 
spending to IPEDS, so this figure is excluded for TCATs. 
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Additionally, within four-year institutions, there is great variation in spending. Many smaller 
private institutions spend much less per pupil than larger, more selective private institutions (i.e., 
Vanderbilt University) and the University of Tennessee – Knoxville, as the state’s flagship and 
most selective public institution, spends much more per pupil than all other public universities.  
Regional Comparison 
 Tennessee is one of sixteen states in the southeast that comprise the Southern Regional 
Education Board (SREB). Analysts often compare Tennessee’s postsecondary enrollment, 
completion rates, state higher education funding and tuition and fees with that of other member 
states (SREB, 2016). On many metrics, Tennessee falls squarely in the middle of its regional 
peers. The state is ranked seventh for full-time equivalent (FTE) enrollment at four-year 
institutions (N = 117,242) and eighth at two-year institutions (N = 31,618) during the 2014-15 
academic year. Tennessee ranks ninth and eighth for degrees awarded by four-year (N = 28,326) 
and two-year institutions (N = 9,501), respectively, during this same time period. Per pupil 
spending on education and general (E&G) expenses was approximately $15,000 at four-years 
(ranked ninth) and $8,300 at two-years (ranked sixth). Tuition and fees at public institutions in 
Tennessee, however, are well above the SREB average: average tuition and fees at a four-year 
institution is approximately $8,000, more expensive than eleven of the sixteen SREB states, 
while average tuition at two-year colleges (approximately $4,000) is greater than thirteen of 
Tennessee’s regional peers (SREB, 2016).    
Higher Education Innovation in Tennessee 
Higher education in Tennessee has evolved substantially over the past decade. Many 
initiatives and programs have been introduced by two education-focused governors (Phil 
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Bredesen (Democrat, served as Governor 2003-2011) and Bill Haslam (Republican, serving as 
Governor 2011-present) and signed into law by a supportive, Republican-dominated legislature.  
The Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program, a statewide merit-based 
aid program was signed into law in 2002; the first recipients entered higher education as 
freshmen in Fall 2004. This program was modeled after existing merit aid programs in the 
southeast United States, namely the Georgia HOPE Scholarship program. Since its 
implementation, the TELS program has served over 300,000 students each year and has 
administered over $1 billion in total grant aid (THEC, 2016b). This program will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4.  
In 2010, Tennessee was a recipient of the United States Department of Education’s 
inaugural Race to the Top grant. While much of this funding was used for K-12 education 
initiatives, a long-lasting project resulting from this grant is the Tennessee Longitudinal Data 
System (TLDS), Tennessee’s student-level P-20 data system. The interagency partnership that 
facilitates data collection and organization has grown to include five state agencies and the Boyd 
Center for Business and Economic Research (BCBER) at the University of Tennessee at 
Knoxville (THEC, 2015). The robustness of this data system is extremely useful for research and 
policy making. For this reason, sustainability funding for the TLDS is now included annually in 
the Governor’s budget, as Race to the Top funding has expired. 
Also in 2010, the Complete College Tennessee Act (CCTA) was enacted. The CCTA 
dramatically changed public higher education in Tennessee by implementing a one hundred 
percent outcomes-based funding formula, developing formalized transfer pathways between 
community colleges and universities, and reducing the availability of remedial and 
developmental coursework, such that it is now delivered only at community colleges (THEC, 
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2015). The CCTA also began statewide conversations about improved alignment between higher 
education and Tennessee’s workforce, a discussion that continues today.  
In 2013, Governor Bill Haslam announced an ambitious college attainment goal: 
Tennessee’s “Drive to 55.” In the spirit of the Lumina Foundation’s “Goal 2025” (Lumina 
Foundation, 2013) and based on the work of Carnevale and colleagues (2012) at the Georgetown 
University Center on Education and the Workforce, the Drive to 55 asserts that 55 percent of 
working-age Tennesseans will have a postsecondary credential by the year 2025. While this 
initiative is an attainment goal, it is as much meant to align postsecondary degrees earned with 
available employment opportunities throughout the state.  
The Drive to 55 is supported by many innovative programs and projects. These programs 
include further changes to remediation (the Seamless Alignment through Integrated Learning 
Support [SAILS] program), increased use of predictive analytics in advising (Degree Compass, 
an online tool for academic advisors), initiatives to reengage adults in higher education 
(Tennessee Reconnect), and competitive grants to postsecondary institutions to align their 
program offerings with the needs of local industry (the Labor and Education Alignment Program 
[LEAP] program) (THEC, 2015). Tennessee Reconnect and LEAP rely heavily on partnerships 
with American Job Centers (AJCs; established and maintained by the Workforce Investment Act 
[WIA] and the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act [WIOA]) and regional career centers 
throughout the state. Through these partnerships, state agency and AJC staff members identify, 
recruit, and support adults who would benefit from engaging or reengaging with higher 
education. Unlike WIA and WIOA, however, Tennessee Reconnect and LEAP emphasize solely 
that adults earn postsecondary degrees, rather than participate in workforce training programs 
that do not result in a credential.  
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The crux of this suite of programs, and the program receiving the most press and interest, 
is the Tennessee Promise. The Tennessee Promise provides two years of tuition and fee-free 
community or technical college to recent high school graduates. The Tennessee Promise is 
modeled after and is identical (at a statewide scale) to Tennessee Achieves, the regional program 
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Figure 1.1. Public higher education governance in Tennessee 
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Figure 1.5. Technical colleges (TCATs) governed by the Tennessee Board of Regents 
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Figure 1.6. Tennessee Independent Colleges and Universities Association (TICUA) member institutions  
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Literature Review and Theoretical Frameworks  
This literature review is guided by two questions: what are the contributors to and 
consequences of undermatch, and what is the influence of county- and state-level financial aid 
programs on undermatch? I begin with a discussion of prior literature that investigates 
undermatch, and why it is of concern to students, educators, and policymakers. I will then 
discuss the literature related to statewide merit scholarships and place-based tuition-free college 
programs, to explore the effects of these programs on students’ enrollment decisions. These 
programs may increase undermatch rates if students are incentivized to attend less selective, 
lower quality institutions. I then present the theoretical frameworks that motivate this work: 
college choice models and human capital theory. I conclude with a discussion of theory 
surrounding the statistical counterfactual and the control groups employed in the analyses 
conducted in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation. 
Literature Review 
Prevalence of Undermatch 
 Recent research estimates that approximately 20 to 60 percent of high school graduates 
undermatch, depending on each study’s sample and definition of undermatch (i.e., Roderick et 
al., 2008, 2009; Bowen, et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2013; Dillon & Smith, 2017; Rodriguez, 
forthcoming). For example, Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson (2009) explore undermatch in their 
often-cited Crossing the Finish Line text, using a sample of 60,000 high school graduates in 
North Carolina. The authors consider a student’s likelihood of admission to North Carolina State 
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University (NCSU) or the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), the two most 
selective public universities in North Carolina. If a student is academically eligible to attend 
NCSU or UNC but does not, he is classified as having undermatched, even if he attends an 
equally selective out-of-state or in-state private institution. Using this definition, Bowen and 
colleagues determine that 43 percent of high school graduates in North Carolina who are eligible 
to attend NCSU or UNC undermatched (Bowen et al., 2009).  
Another widely cited study conducted by Roderick and colleagues (2008) at the Chicago 
Consortium for School Research uses a much different definition of undermatch. Using two 
cohorts of Chicago Public Schools (CPS) graduates, the authors determine the Barron’s 
selectivity categories of institutions at which students are eligible to enroll. They conclude that 
62 percent of CPS graduates undermatch, as they do not attend an institution with the highest 
Barron’s rating at which they are academically eligible.  
These highly-publicized studies provide two examples of how estimates of undermatch 
differ substantially based on the definition used. As such, the stated rates of undermatch cannot 
be compared, and one is not necessarily more correct than the other. The pitfalls of researchers 
using multiple definitions of undermatch are explored at length by Rodriguez (forthcoming) and 
in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. It is worth noting, however, that irrespective of the definition, 
students who undermatch are disproportionately nonwhite, lower income, graduated from less 
resourced high schools, and have parents who have not earned a postsecondary degrees (i.e., Fry, 
2002; Alon & Tienda, 2005; Bowen, et al., 2009; Roderick, et al., 2008, 2009; Smith et al., 2013; 
Dillon & Smith, 2017; Rodriguez, forthcoming).  
Contributors to Undermatch  
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Undermatch often occurs due to students’ lack of information about the college search 
and application processes, college costs, and financial aid (i.e., Ikenberry & Hartle, 2008; Bowen 
et al., 2009; Hoxby & Avery, 2003; Scott-Clayton, 2012; Smith, et al., 2013; Roderick et al., 
2008, 2009). Literature exploring each of these contributors will be examined at length below. 
Nonwhite, lower income, and first generation college students have more limited access to this 
information relative to their white, higher income peers, resulting in an increased likelihood of 
undermatch (i.e., Horn, Chen, & Chapman, 2003; Avery & Kane, 2004; Roderick, et al., 2008, 
2009; Rodriguez, forthcoming).  
College search and application processes. Many high school students, particularly 
those who are nonwhite and lower income, rely on their high school guidance counselors for 
support when conducting a college search (Terenzini, Cabrera, & Bernal, 2001; Horn et al., 
2003; Zarate & Pachon, 2006). Guidance counselors, however, often lack the necessary 
information to advise these students, and are frequently overloaded or unavailable (Burdman, 
2005; Avery, Bettinger, Hoxby, & Turner, 2009; Roderick et al., 2009; Smith, 2012). As such, 
these students who have the greatest need for their support do not get it, and therefore may seek 
information about college-going from less credible sources (i.e., peers, unreliable online 
resources).   
High achieving students from low income backgrounds struggle with the college search 
process as much as their low achieving peers (Roderick et al., 2009). Avery and colleagues 
(2009) conclude that 82 percent of high achieving, low income students do not apply to 
institutions that are on par with their academic abilities. Further, Alon & Tienda (2005) 
determine that high achieving Hispanic students are disproportionately likely to enroll in a 
community college or vocational program, as compared to their non-Hispanic peers. The authors 
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conclude that this is due to a lack of information and support from teachers, guidance counselors, 
and other adults during high school (Alon & Tienda, 2005).   
To address the lack of knowledge about the college search and application processes, 
Hoxby and Turner (2013) conducted a randomized controlled trial, randomly assigning high 
achieving, low income students to receive information about postsecondary opportunities via 
mail. These materials include information about colleges and universities at which students 
would be an appropriate academic match and/or information for parents, fee waivers for college 
applications, and net cost calculators. Students who received this information were more likely 
than their peers to apply to and enroll at institutions at which they are a better academic match, 
that boast higher graduation rates, and have increased instructional resources, relative to their 
peers who did not receive these materials (Hoxby & Turner, 2013).  
Students who do not conduct a thorough college search are less likely to apply to 
institutions that are appropriate academic matches (Bowen et al., 2009; Smith, 2012). Surveys 
and interviews conducted by the Chicago Consortium on School Research conclude that high 
achieving graduates of Chicago Public Schools know little about the colleges and universities at 
which they would be well-matched, and instead apply to the institutions most often attended by 
their peers (Roderick et al., 2009). They apply to institutions that sound familiar, are near home, 
or at which they know a number of friends or high school classmates (Roderick, et al., 2009). 
College costs and financial aid. Many students and their families cannot accurately 
estimate the costs of college. They often overestimate how much college costs, while 
underestimating how much financial aid is available (Government Accountability Office, 1990; 
Horn et al., 2003; Avery & Kane, 2004). As such, they may assume they cannot afford to attend 
a selective college or university, as these institutions are more expensive than those that are less 
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selective (Bowen, et al., 2009; Scott-Clayton, 2012). Horn and colleagues (2003) report that only 
24 percent of surveyed high school students could accurately predict college costs, while 28 
percent estimated the cost of college to be more than double the actual cost. Those surveyed by 
Ikenberry and Hartle (2008) overestimated the cost of attending a four-year institution by 212 
percent, and a two-year college by 193 percent (Ikenberry & Hartle, 2008; Scott-Clayton, 2012). 
Given these gross overestimates, many students believe college to be unaffordable and out of 
reach. Knowledge of college costs is related to family income and student race (Horn et al., 
2003; Avery & Kane, 2004, Grodsky & Jones, 2007). Low income students were 24 percentage 
points less likely than higher income students to accurately estimate college costs, while only 18 
percent of Latino students were able to accurately identify college costs and sources of financial 
aid (Horn et al., 2003; Zarate & Pachon, 2006). 
Students’ access to institutions at which they are academically well-matched is further 
inhibited when they do not know how to complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid 
(FAFSA) and apply for financial aid. The complexity of the FAFSA presents a significant barrier 
to students applying for financial aid, as many items on the FAFSA are confusing and redundant 
(Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2006; Avery et al., 2009; Scott-Clayton, 2012; Dynarski & 
Wiederspan, 2012). An experiment conducted by Bettinger and colleagues (2012) provided 
FAFSA filing support for students and their families when their taxes were prepared. These 
researchers found a dramatic increase in students’ likelihood of completing and filing a FAFSA, 
and a subsequent 8 percentage point increase in a student’s probability of attending college. 
Consequences of Undermatch 
Economic returns to attending a selective institution. Many researchers have 
concluded that there is a substantial economic benefit to attending a highly selective, high quality 
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postsecondary institution (i.e., Kingston & Smart, 1990; Loury & Garman, 1995; Bowen & Bok, 
1998; Brewer, Eide, & Ehrenberg, 1999; Zhang, 2005). Undermatched students who attend less 
selective institutions than those at which they are academically eligible, experience diminished 
lifetime earnings relative to those who attend more selective institutions. This is particularly 
important when considering the social mobility often attributed to attending selective institutions, 
especially among nonwhite and lower income students – those who most often undermatch 
(Bowen & Bok, 1998, Fry, 2002; Alon & Tienda, 2005; Brand, 2010; Brand & Xie, 2010).   
Brewer and colleagues (1999) demonstrate that attending an elite, private university 
results in increased economic returns for all students who enroll. Zhang (2005) confirms this 
finding, stating that the returns to high quality schooling differ by one’s definition of “high 
quality.” The definition notwithstanding, attending a high quality institution yields a greater 
economic return than one of lower quality (Zhang, 2005). Black & Smith (2004) determine that 
men and women who attend a high quality college or university earn 11 and 7.5 percent more, 
respectively, than those who do not. Additionally, Brand & Halaby (2006) posit that economic 
returns to attending a more selective institution are experienced through educational attainment 
and occupational status, which translate for many students into increased wages and lifetime 
earnings.   
Using a sample of students who applied to an identical set of colleges and universities, 
Dale & Krueger (2002) compare the earnings of those who were accepted to a selective 
university but did not attend, with those of students who did attend. The authors demonstrate that 
the economic returns to attending a selective institution were higher for students from lower 
income backgrounds. In 2011, the same authors conclude that the relationship between 
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institutional selectivity and earnings is substantial only for black, Hispanic, and lower income 
students (Dale & Krueger, 2014).  
Some debate surrounds the economic returns to attending a community college, in 
isolation or en route to a bachelor’s degree (i.e., Reynolds, 2012; Hoekstra, 2009; Zimmerman, 
2014; Doyle, 2009; Long & Kurlaender, 2008). The “community college penalty” is relevant 
when discussing college choice and undermatch, as many states are proposing or have recently 
implemented tuition-free community college initiatives. Reynolds (2012) concludes that 
attending a community college results in negative labor market outcomes relative to those who 
attend four-year institutions. Men and women who attend a community college earn 7.7 percent 
and 10.3 percent less, respectively, when they first enter the workforce, relative to those who 
graduate from a four-year institution (Reynolds, 2012). Hoekstra (2009) uses a regression 
discontinuity design to determine that students who were barely academically eligible to attend 
the state flagship university earned 20 percent more over their lifetimes than did those who were 
barely ineligible. Similarly, Zimmerman (2014) demonstrates that a marginal student who 
attends a four-year institution instead of a community college earns approximately 8 percent 
more over the first 8 years of his career, relative to his academically-comparable peers who 
attended a community college.  
Increased graduation rates and institutional resources. Highly selective 
postsecondary institutions boast higher graduation rates relative to less selective colleges and 
universities (i.e., Bowen & Bok, 1998; Melguizo, 2008; Alon & Tienda, 2005; Kane, 1998; 
Kingston & Lewis, 1990). As such, students who undermatch reduce their likelihood of 
graduating when they attend an institution that is less selective than one in which they could have 
enrolled. Melguizo (2008) uses data from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) to 
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explore whether high graduation rates are a function of enrolling high achieving high school 
graduates, or if institutional quality itself affects degree completion. She concludes that students 
who attend selective institutions are more likely to earn a Bachelor’s degree compared to their 
peers of similar ability who attend less selective institutions. Alon and Tienda (2005) determine 
that this is particularly true of black and Hispanic students. The authors investigate the 
“mismatch hypothesis” that nonwhite students who attend selective institutions as a result of 
affirmative action programs graduate at lower rates than their peers at nonselective institutions 
(Alon & Tienda, 2005, p. 295). They find the opposite to be true: nonwhite students who attend 
higher quality institutions are more likely to earn a degree than their peers who attend less 
selective institutions (Alon & Tienda, 2005).  
Highly selective institutions also have additional resources available to their students, 
compared to less selective colleges and universities (i.e., Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner, 2010; 
Hoxby, 2009; Kane, Orszag & Gunter, 2003; Light & Strayer, 2000). Bound and colleagues 
(2010) determine that less selective four-year institutions have fewer resources (as measured by 
faculty-student ratios) available. As such, students who attend these institutions, particularly 
males, have a lower likelihood of earning a Bachelor’s degree. Hoxby (2009) confirms this 
finding, asserting that more selective four-year institutions spend, on average, almost eight times 
as much per pupil than a less selective four-year colleges and universities, to say nothing of the 
modest resources provided to community college students (Hoxby, 2009). Hoxby states that 
irrespective of the measure of resources (instructional resources, faculty qualifications, or 
facilities, for example) more selective colleges and universities are better resourced. This 
stratification in resources can be seen in the appendix to Chapter 1 of this dissertation, which 
display the differences in resources by institution type in Tennessee. More selective, private 
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four-year institutions have many more resources than those that are less selective, which have 
only slightly greater resources than community and technical colleges across the state.  
Statewide Merit Aid Programs and Undermatch 
Statewide merit aid programs have been studied at length since the inception of the 
Georgia HOPE Scholarship program in 1993. It is well documented that while these programs do 
not necessarily induce students to enroll in higher education (i.e., Dynarski 2004; Bruce & 
Carruthers, 2014) they do influence where students enroll. While some have concluded that 
students receiving merit scholarships substitute away from two-year institution into four-years, 
as the cost of doing so is reduced (Dynarski, 2004; Bruce & Carruthers, 2014; Zhang, Hu, Sun, 
& Pu, 2016), others have determined that students enroll in lower quality (often public) 
institutions rather than more selective (often private) institutions because they are able to use the 
state’s merit aid funds (i.e., Goodman, 2008; Cohodes & Goodman, 2014; Rodriguez, 2016). 
These conflicting findings demonstrate the need for increased investigation of the impact of 
these programs on student match. 
Cohodes (2014) and Goodman (2008, 2014) determine that students in Massachusetts are 
willing to sacrifice institutional quality for relatively little merit aid and enroll in less selective 
public institutions, so they may use their award dollars. These students subsequently earn 
degrees at lower rates compared to their peers who did not take advantage of the state-sponsored 
merit aid and attended more selective institutions. Goodman (2008) concludes that students who 
are lower income and lower achieving respond to the reduction in price at higher rates than their 
higher income, higher achieving peers (Goodman 2008). As it is often lower income students 
who undermatch, this is cause for concern, because these students are choosing to attend lower 
quality institutions than others at which they were eligible to enroll. Further, Rodriguez (2016) 
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states that average achieving students who receive merit aid may be induced to attend four-year 
institutions that have resources and a study body more similar to a community college than 
selective four-year institutions. This finding again leads to questions of match and fit, and the 
returns to attending less selective four-year institutions in light of receiving merit aid.    
Place-Based Tuition-Free College Initiatives and Undermatch  
While the national conversation around tuition-free college is relatively new, a number of 
communities (i.e., Knox County, Tennessee and Kalamazoo, Michigan) have had free college 
programs in place for almost a decade. As such, the literature exploring these initiatives is 
limited to those that have been implemented for a few years. These programs may have differing 
impacts on match, increasing or decreasing local rates of undermatch depending on the structure 
of each free college opportunity.   
Carruthers and Fox (2016) investigate Knox Achieves, a free community and technical 
college program in Knox County, Tennessee that served as the model for Tennessee Achieves 
and the Tennessee Promise, regional and statewide free college programs that will be discussed 
at length in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Using difference-in-differences and propensity score 
matching techniques, the authors determine that Knox Achieves increased students’ likelihood of 
enrolling in higher education following high school, particularly among low income students. 
Further, they determine that Knox Achieves led to some “down shifting” from four-year to two-
year institutions, raising questions about undermatch among treated students (Carruthers & Fox, 
2016).    
In 2005, the Kalamazoo Promise was implemented in Kalamazoo, Michigan. This 
program provides free tuition to any public postsecondary institution in Michigan to graduates of 
Kalamazoo Public Schools. The Kalamazoo Promise is not limited to less-than-four year 
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institutions and as such, has resulted in an increased number of students from Kalamazoo 
submitting their ACT scores to the most selective public institutions in Michigan – the 
University of Michigan and Michigan State University (Andrews, DesJardins, & Ranchhod, 
2010). As undermatch most often occurs during the search and application stages of students’ 
college decision-making, sending standardized test scores to selective institutions may indicate 
that the Kalamazoo Promise has decreased the rate of undermatch among students with access to 
this program. 
Further study of the Kalamazoo Promise by Bartik and colleagues (2015) demonstrates 
that this program resulted in an increase in overall college-going (as was the case with Knox 
Achieves) and decreased enrollment at non-Promise eligible institutions (i.e., ineligible private 
institutions). They also found a positive effect on degree attainment within six years of 
enrollment. The authors conclude, based on this evidence, that simple and generous scholarships 
have the potential to increase postsecondary enrollment and attainment (Bartik, Hershbein, & 
Lachowska, 2015). Paired with messaging and outreach, free college programs have been found 
to increase enrollment at relatively low cost to the state (Pharris-Ciurej, Herting, & Hirschman, 
2012; Bartik & Lachowska, 2013; Pluhta & Penny, 2013). However, little is known at this time 
about the role of these programs and student match – a deficit I address with Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation.  
Limitations of Prior Literature 
This dissertation contributes to existing literature by addressing a number of limitations 
to prior literature. First, each study of undermatch employs a unique definition of undermatch, 
based on authors’ specific research questions and available data. These varied definitions lead to 
different conclusions about the prevalence of undermatch. The first paper in this dissertation 
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applies five definitions of undermatch to one sample of high school graduates to determine the 
influence of the definition on conclusions about undermatch. This extends the work of Rodriguez 
(forthcoming) by using administrative data from a state student information system, rather than a 
national dataset.   
While much of the literature investigating state merit aid programs discusses the effects 
of these programs on students’ postsecondary enrollment decisions, little has been written to 
directly address the influence of these programs on undermatch. As the political context 
surrounding the award structure of the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) 
program is evolving, concrete evidence about this program’s effects on undermatch will be 
useful to policymakers, both in Tennessee and other states with similarly structured programs.  
Additionally, the rise of free community college programs across the United States has 
garnered much attention. These initiatives are so new, however, that very little has been written 
about them. This dissertation’s third paper investigates the influence of Tennessee Achieves, one 
of the first regional programs of this sort, on undermatch, using a quasi-experimental approach 
that will help states to more fully understand the effects of free college programs as many 
propose to implement their own.  
As a whole, this dissertation provides improved information about undermatch to 
academics and policymakers alike, exploring the influence of decade-old (Tennessee Education 
Lottery Scholarship) and more recent (Tennessee Achieves) programs on undermatch. The 




 The theoretical frameworks that anchor this work are human capital theory and college 
choice models. College choice models describe the process by which students decide to enroll in 
higher education, while human capital theory highlights the economic rationale for doing so. 
Each of these frameworks has implications for investigations of undermatch. While human 
capital theory clarifies and emphasizes why the implications of undermatch are of concern, 
college choice models can be applied differently to subpopulations of students who most often 
undermatch.  
Human Capital Theory 
Human capital theory is the economic framework most commonly applied to K-12 and 
higher education (i.e., Paulsen & Toutkoushian, 2008). This theory posits that students invest in 
their own human capital by pursuing higher education, to gain skills and knowledge to increase 
their future productivity, thereby increasing their expected lifetime utility (Becker, 1993; 
Manski, 1993; Paulsen, 2001). Productivity differs, according to Becker (1993), based not only 
on the quantity but the quality of higher education in which the student invests. Human capital 
theory is therefore relevant to discussions of undermatch: students who attend higher education 
institutions that are less selective or of lower quality than those they are academically eligible to 
attend may not be investing appropriately in their own human capital. Instead, they are perhaps 
minimizing short term actual costs (i.e., attending a less selective institution that is perceived to 
be less costly) or opportunity costs (i.e., attending a community college part time while working 
full time) at the expense of long term utility.  
 When deciding to invest in higher education, human capital theory assumes that students 
act rationally as they weigh short-term costs (i.e., tuition, fees, psychic costs, opportunity costs, 
and lost wages) against long-term benefits such as improved job opportunities and increased 
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future earnings. This rational behavior is based on available information (Becker, 1993; 
DesJardins & Toutkoushian, 2005). As students who are likely to undermatch often lack access 
to information about the college and financial aid application processes (Bowen, et al., 2009; 
Roderick et al., 2008, 2009), they are not always aware of or able to accurately estimate the short 
terms costs and future benefits of higher education. This is because they lack access to informed 
adults (i.e., teachers and guidance counselors), do not experience a college-going culture at their 
high school and in some cases, have inconsistent internet access (Bergerson, 2009; Bowen, et al., 
2009; Roderick, et al, 2008, 2009). As such, the search costs to gather this information are high, 
resulting in an information deficit. Their enrollment decisions, while rational given the 
information available to them, may not result in increases to their human capital: they often 
enroll in colleges or universities that are local, are familiar, or where they know other students 
rather than those at which they are the best academic match (Roderick et al., 2008, 2009).  
However, individuals make college-going decisions in ways that reflect their personal 
preferences (utility) and tolerance for risk and uncertainty (Paulsen, 2001; DesJardins & 
Toutkoushian, 2005). Students’ utility is comprised of many factors (i.e., affordability, proximity 
to home, athletic opportunities), and they often make college-going decisions that optimize 
different portions of their utility curves. For example, while one student may seek to enroll in the 
most selective institution to which he is accepted, another may want to attend the lowest cost 
institution, or the institution closest to home, or an institution best known for stellar athletics. 
Students’ and families’ utility, as well as risk aversion, may explain why some students 
undermatch: their preferences are not to attend highly selective institutions, but those that meet 
other criteria (Paulsen, 2001; DesJardins & Toutkoushian, 2005). While this behavior is rational 
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based on a student’s preferences, these college-going decisions still may reduce future earning 
potential when they result in students attending less selective, lower quality institutions. 
From a policy perspective, interventions to mitigate undermatch must consider the 
myriad factors that comprise students’ utility curves, and what factors students are attempting to 
optimize when making college-going decisions. Providing financial aid to encourage high 
achieving, low income students to attend selective institutions, for example, will not reduce 
undermatch if the reason that these students are not attending these institutions is not financial, 
but a desire to stay close to family and friends in his hometown. As different preferences will 
dictate students’ responses to attempts at reducing undermatch, increased diversity in the 
methods by which educators and policymakers attempt to reduce undermatch is necessary to 
increase match among high achieving students. 
In Tennessee, decade-old and more recent higher education policies - the Tennessee 
Education Lottery Scholarship and Tennessee Achieves programs, respectively, which are 
discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 5 - provide a financial incentive to students to attend two 
year or technical colleges, or lower cost, less selective in-state institutions. Therefore, it is 
possible that these programs are contributing to increased undermatch and diminished human 
capital statewide, if students’ preferences lead them to enroll at lower quality institutions that are 
made more affordable and closer to home, rather than those that are the best academic match. 
Decreasing the state’s human capital is the opposite of the programs’ stated objectives, and as 
such, human capital theory will provide a critical framework for evaluating the effects of these 
programs on students’ enrollment decisions. 
Hossler and Gallagher’s (1987) College Choice Model  
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 While many stage-based college choice models exist, one of the most frequently cited 
(Bergerson, 2009, p. 21) is Hossler and Gallagher’s (1987) three-stage model of college choice. 
Each stage of this model – predisposition, search, and choice – is of consequence to students 
making postsecondary enrollment decisions.  
Predisposition. The predisposition stage represents the development of students’ college 
aspirations and expectations (Bergerson, 2009, p. 22). Students’ postsecondary ambitions are 
shaped by a number of factors. Socioeconomic status influences predisposition, as low income 
students are more price-sensitive than their higher income peers, and many assume they simply 
cannot afford to go to college (Callander & Jackson, 2008; Dynarski, 2002, 2003; Grodsky & 
Jones, 2007; Lillis, 2008). Parental involvement in the college-going process and whether the 
parents themselves have postsecondary experience also contributes to how a student thinks about 
going to college (Conley, 2001; Ellwood & Kane, 2000; Hossler & Stage, 1992). A peer group 
that aspires to go to college, along with supportive teachers and counselors, can also positively 
shape students ambitions (Muhammad, 2008; Perez & McDonough, 2008). Interactions with 
school personnel, as well as the college-going culture in a middle or high school, are additional 
positive influences on students’ ambitions (Roderick, Nagoaka, Coca & Moeller, 2008, 2009). 
Finally, academic achievement – a student characteristic rather than a family or school 
characteristic –inform aspirations. A student who is higher achieving may have aspirations 
different from his lower achieving peers (Hossler, Schmit, & Vesper, 1999).  
Search. The search stage of Hossler and Gallagher’s (1987) college choice model occurs 
when students form a choice set of institutions to which they may apply (Bergerson, 2009, p. 24). 
The crux of this stage is information gathering (Hossler & Gallagher, 1987). Students seek 
information from campus resources, peers, teachers and counselors, and institutional 
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representatives, and, among recent cohorts of high school students, the internet (Hossler et al 
1999; Hartley & Morphew, 2008; Roderick, et al., 2008). Also, as with the predisposition stage, 
parental engagement informs the search stage. Feedback from parents about price, proximity to 
home, and expectations about institutional quality inform students’ choice set of institutions 
(Hossler, et al., 1999).  
Choice. During the third stage of Hossler and Gallagher’s (1987) college choice model, 
students select a higher education institution at which to enroll. As this point, institutional 
characteristics, particularly cost and financial aid, play a profound role in a student’s decision 
about where to attend (i.e., Dynarski, 2002, 2003; Curs & Singell, 2002; DesJardins, Ahlburg, & 
McCall, 2006; Hossler et al., 1999; Paulsen & St. John, 2002). Further, students’ choice also 
relies on institutional characteristics such as location, course and major offerings, and reputation 
(i.e., DesJardins, Dundar, & Hendel, 1999; Goenner & Pauls, 2006; Roderick et al., 2008, 2009).  
Deficits in Process and Undermatch 
 Each stage of Hossler and Gallagher’s (1987) college choice model unfolds differently 
for students who are traditionally underrepresented in higher education, particularly those who 
are nonwhite or low income. As these student subgroups frequently undermatch, it is probable 
that deficits in this process, especially during the search stage, contribute to students’ likelihood 
of undermatching (i.e., Bergerson, 2009; Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009; Roderick et al., 
2008; 2009).  
Predisposition. Nonwhite and low income students attend schools lacking a college-
going culture at rates that exceed their white and upper income peers (Lucas & Good, 2001; 
Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004). As such, they are not always exposed to school personnel with high 
expectations related to college-going, and interact with peer groups who are not college-minded 
 52 
(i.e., Goodard, 2003; Roderick, et al., 2008, 2009). Further, many nonwhite and low income 
students are first generation college-goers, whose parents do not have experience or are 
disengaged from conversations about college-going (Hossler & Stage, 1992; Hossler & Vesper, 
1993; Perna, 2000). These students are less predisposed to attend college at all, let alone aspire to 
attend an institution at which they are an appropriate academic match.  
Search. Nonwhite and lower income students gather information about postsecondary 
options in ways that are different from their white, upper income peers. They often do not have 
access to teachers, guidance counselors, parents, friends and community members who are well-
informed about the college search and application processes (Grodsky & Jones, 2007; Ikenberry 
& Hartle, 1998). Further, these student subgroups may lack reliable internet access at home or at 
school. As the internet has become a primary source of information gathering, these students are 
at a further disadvantage in the search process (Hartley & Morphew, 2008; Roderick, et al., 
2008). In particular, nonwhite and low income students often lack information about financial 
aid, as many overestimate the costs of college and underestimate the availability of financial aid 
(Ikenberry & Hartle, 1998; Scott-Clayton, 2012). These students may assume they cannot afford 
to go to a high quality, more selective institution, as they are more price sensitive than their peers 
(Dynarski, 2002, 2003; Paulsen & St. John, 2002) so may limit their search to institutions they 
believe they can afford, leading to an increased likelihood of undermatch. 
Choice. At this stage, students decide on the institution at which they will enroll. During 
this time, students focus on factors such as the cost of attendance and the institution’s location 
(i.e. DesJardins, et al, 2006; Grodsky, 2002; Ikenberry & Hartle, 1998) and as such, may choose 
to enroll at the most affordable institution or the institution that is closest to home, irrespective of 
selectivity or quality. This is particularly true for student subgroups at high risk of 
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undermatching, increasing the prevalence of undermatch among nonwhite and lower income 
students (Roderick et al., 2008, 2009).  
Perna’s (2006) College Choice Model  
Perna’s model of college choice (2006) is more integrative, combining aspects of human 
capital theory and traditional sociological models of college choice. This model also accounts 
more explicitly for the role of social and cultural capital – students’ knowledge of norms and 
language surrounding college going, which are often central to students’ enrollment decisions 
and subsequent match (Perna, 2006; Dika & Singh, 2002). Rather than treat the college choice 
process as sequential (i.e., students do X, then Y, then Z), Perna discusses this process as 
embedded in a student’s school, community, and social contexts, among others.  
 Perna’s model is comprised of four layers. Layer one, the innermost layer, reflects a 
student’s habitus: his or her demographic characteristics, social and cultural capital, demand for 
higher education and the supply of resources available to pursue higher education, and expected 
costs and benefits. As students often undermatch due to a lack of social and cultural capital 
related to higher education, and misunderstand the costs of enrolling, this layer is relevant to 
studies of undermatch, and emphasizes the need for access to information about the costs and 
benefits of college going, as well as support throughout the application process.  
 The second layer of Perna’s model is the students’ school and community context, which 
considers the structures and resources in the school and community environments that enhance 
or hinder students’ college going decisions. For lower income, nonwhite students – those who 
most often undermatch – a lack of college going culture and personnel resources (i.e., a capable 
college counselor) in the high school may contribute substantially to undermatch rates (Stanton-
Salazar, 1997; Bowen, et al., 2009).  
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 The higher education context, the model’s third layer, depicts the role of recruitment, 
communication and marketing from higher education institutions to high school students. As 
very selective, high quality postsecondary institutions often do not communicate with or recruit 
students who attend under resourced high schools, they forgo opportunities to enroll high 
achieving students from these schools, increasing undermatch. Also, colleges and universities 
often visit high schools close to their campuses, providing information about local postsecondary 
options. As undermatched students often enroll at institutions that are close to home, irrespective 
of academic match, this may be an additional factor contributing to undermatch. 
 The social, economic and policy context, the fourth layer of Perna’s college choice 
model, is particularly relevant to explorations of undermatch in Tennessee. This is because many 
state-level higher education policies; state-funded financial aid programs (i.e., the Tennessee 
Education Lottery Scholarship program and Tennessee Achieves) in particular, provide a 
financial incentive for students to attend a two-year institution rather than a four-year college or 
university. As such, increased undermatch may be an unintended consequence of such programs. 
Further, there is pervasive conversation about the importance of higher education to finding and 
securing sustainable employment in the state, demonstrating the potential role of macro-level 
contexts on students’ postsecondary decision making.  
Relative to sequential, stage-based models, Perna’s (2006) model of college choice may 
more accurately reflect the contexts in which a nonwhite or low income student at risk for 
undermatch is making college-going decisions – the family, school, higher education, and policy 
contexts. Each of these contexts may more accurately account for the different experiences of 




 Counterfactual analyses of causation attempt to explain what would have happened “had 
the world been different,” had a treatment not occurred or a program not been established. These 
analyses focus on distinct, temporally successive events (i.e., if X did not first occur, Y would 
not have occurred) to determine causality (Lewis, 1973). Lewis (1973) discusses this theory in 
terms of a “possible world,” a hypothetical universe in which one can determine what would 
have happened in the absence of an event (Lewis, 1973). 
 The next best option, as a “possible world” is an impossible idea, is a randomized 
controlled trial (RCT). When conducting an RCT, participants are randomly assigned to receive 
an intervention (“treatment”) or not (“control”) such that their outcomes may be compared. 
RCTs are considered to be the “gold standard” for causal research, but are not always possible to 
conduct due to resources, ethics, political constraints, etc.  
 In the absence of an RCT, quasi-experimental methods facilitate the creation of a 
statistical counterfactual, a group within the sample that serves as a control group. In Chapter 4 
of this dissertation, I conduct a regression discontinuity analysis. The counterfactual for this 
study is the group of students just below the threshold for General Assembly Merit Scholarship 
receipt, whose outcomes are compared to those just above the threshold. These students are 
comparable to those who receive treatment on a number of observable characteristics, the 
difference being that they did not receive scholarship funds due to their ACT composite score, 
while their peers just above the threshold did. In Chapter 5, I use difference-in-differences and 
propensity score matching strategies to explore the effects of Tennessee Achieves, the tuition-
free community and technical college program that preceded the statewide Tennessee Promise 
program. The counterfactuals when using these two methods are the difference in outcomes 
 56 
before and after treatment between those who were and were not treated, and statistically 
comparable control students, determined based on their propensity to participate in Tennessee 
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Chapter 3 
The Effect of Multiple Definitions on Undermatch Rates in Tennessee 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the prevalence of postsecondary undermatch among recent high 
school graduates in Tennessee. Using student-level data provided by the Tennessee Higher 
Education Commission, five definitions of undermatch are applied to one sample of high school 
graduates to determine the sensitivity of undermatch rates to the way undermatch is defined. 
These definitions yield undermatch rates of 21 to 69 percent of high school graduates, 
demonstrating that the definition of undermatch is relevant to the conclusions drawn about this 
issue. Irrespective of the definition applied, students who are nonwhite and lower income 




Postsecondary undermatch definition  
Postsecondary undermatch occurs when a student attends a college or university at which 
he is academically overqualified relative to other students enrolled at that institution (i.e, Black 
& Smith, 2004, 2006; Roderick, Nagaoka, Coca, & Moeller, 2008, 2009; Bowen, Chingos & 
McPherson, 2009; Smith, Pender, & Howell, 2013; Dillon & Smith, 2017). The academic 
indicators most commonly used to determine whether a student is appropriately matched to the 
institution he attends are his high school grade point average (GPA) and composite standardized 
test scores (ACT or SAT score).  
Prevalence of postsecondary undermatch in the United States 
Prior research estimates that the nationwide undermatch rate ranges from 20 to 60 percent 
of high school graduates, depending on each study’s sample and definition of undermatch (e.g., 
Roderick et al., 2008, 2009; Bowen, et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2013; Dillon & Smith, 2017). Each 
author who has written about undermatch has defined this phenomenon differently, and uses 
unique indicators of students’ academic ability and of college quality. Because of this, these 
undermatch rates are not comparable. However, students who undermatch, no matter the 
definition, are disproportionately nonwhite, low income, graduated from under-resourced high 
schools, and have parents without a postsecondary degree (Fry, 2002; Alon & Tienda, 2003; 
Bowen, et al., 2009; Roderick, et al., 2008, 2009; Smith et al., 2013; Dillon & Smith, 2017).   
Contributors to undermatch 
Many high school graduates undermatch because they are not well informed about the 
college and financial aid application processes (i.e., application deadlines, how to complete the 
Free Application for Federal Student Aid) and/or the costs of college, as they believe the net cost 
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of attendance to be much greater than it is (Scott-Clayton, 2012). Further, they are unsure about 
the most appropriate postsecondary options for students with their academic abilities, they attend 
high schools that lack college-going cultures, and rely on the insights of their (often 
misinformed) peers and time-constrained teachers and guidance counselors when seeking 
information about higher education opportunities (i.e, Ikenberry & Hartle, 1998; Bowen et al., 
2009; Hoxby & Avery, 2003; Roderick et al., 2009; Smith, et al., 2013). Because of these 
information deficits, many students enroll at an institution that is less selective (and often less 
expensive) than one they are academically eligible to attend.  
Consequences of undermatch 
Students who undermatch experience longer time-to-degree, and are less likely to 
graduate than their peers who are well-matched at an academically appropriate institution 
(Bowen, et al., 2009; Wyner, Bridgeland, & Diiulio, 2009). This may be due to a lack of fit 
between the student and the institution, as well as the fact that lower quality, less selective 
institutions often have fewer resources and support services available to aid students and increase 
success (Roderick et al., 2008, 2009; Bowen et al., 2009).  
Further, the economic returns to high quality postsecondary education cause educators 
and policymakers to be concerned with undermatch. There exists a substantial economic benefit 
to attending a more selective institution, relative to a less selective, lower quality institution (i.e., 
Kingston & Smart, 1990; Loury & Garman, 1995; Bowen & Bok, 1998; Brewer, Eide, & 
Ehrenberg, 1999). As such, undermatched students who attend less selective institutions than 
those they are academically eligible to attend diminish their lifetime earnings. This is important 
when considering the social mobility often attributed to earning a degree at selective institutions, 
particularly among nonwhite and lower income student subgroups – the students who most often 
 67 
undermatch (Bowen & Bok, 1998, Fry, 2002; Alon & Tienda, 2003; Brand, 2010; Brand & Xie, 
2010).   
The personal and social returns to high quality postsecondary education are also 
substantial. College graduates are more likely to have health insurance and employee-sponsored 
benefits, express higher levels of job satisfaction, be more engaged parents, and be in better 
health  (Baum, Ma, & Payea, 2010). Additionally, those who graduate from college are twice as 
likely as high school graduates to vote, as well as volunteer with civic, community, and social 
welfare groups (Brand, 2010; Brady, Schlozman, & Verba, 1999; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Berry, 
1996; Hauser, 2000; Dee, 2004).   
Contribution and Research Questions 
This paper contributes to existing undermatch literature by applying five definitions of 
undermatch to one sample of recent high school graduates to determine the effect of each 
definition on rates of undermatch in Tennessee. This paper updates and builds upon the work of 
Rodriguez (forthcoming) in which she uses ELS:2002 data to conduct a similar exploration of 
differing definitions of undermatch. Using more recent cohorts of high school graduates from 
one state controls for the ways in which the state’s economy and state-level higher education 
initiatives (i.e., need- and merit-based financial aid programs) impact students’ college choices, 
while exploring the prevalence of undermatch in the state.  
In exploring further the effects of different definitions of undermatch, I emphasize the 
importance of researchers clearly stating how they are conceptualizing and defining undermatch, 
such that conversations about this issue are consistent and comparable.  As Tennessee is at the 
forefront of many ambitious higher education initiatives, for example, it is imperative that any 
discussion of these programs’ effects on undermatch (i.e., offering tuition free community 
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college to recent high school graduates) are determined using explicit, transparent definitions of 
what it means to undermatch.  
This paper will apply five definitions of undermatch to determine the following: 
1. How sensitive are estimates of undermatch in Tennessee to different definitions of 
undermatch? 
 
2. What are the characteristics of recent high school graduates in Tennessee who 
undermatch? Do student characteristics differ by each definition of undermatch? 
 
I hypothesize that, while each definition will yield a strikingly different estimate of 
undermatch, students of color, students who are first-generation college entrants and students 
who are Pell eligible will undermatch at higher rates than their white, upper income peers whose 
parents are college graduates.  
Definitions of Undermatch 
To determine the definitions of undermatch included in this paper, I consider the features 
and drawbacks of the definitions used in prior, often-cited works. These definitions and their use 
in prior analyses are discussed at length below.  
Roderick et al. (2009) 
I first apply the definition of undermatch used by Roderick et al. in their work published 
by the Consortium on Chicago School Research (CCSR). I adapt the authors’ GPA and ACT 
score matrix to determine whether students are eligible to attend any four-year college or 
university in Tennessee, or if they are academically eligible to attend a less-than-four-year 
institution. Details related to this matrix are presented in Table 3.3. Using this matrix and 
considering the selectivity of four-year institutions in Tennessee, any student who scores an 18 
or higher on the ACT and earns a high school GPA of 2.5 or higher is eligible to attend at least 
one four-year college or university in the state. Therefore, the first definition of undermatch 
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classifies those who did not attend a four-year institution when they were academically eligible 
to do so (and instead attended a community college or technical college) as having 
undermatched.
6
 This is referred to by Rodriguez as the “enrollment rate” method. 
Bowen, et al. (2009) 
The second, narrower definition of undermatch is that used by Bowen, et al. (2009) in 
their Crossing the Finish Line text. These authors define undermatched students as those who 
were eligible to attend the most selective public universities in North Carolina (The University of 
North Carolina – Chapel Hill and North Carolina State University), but did not.  
The four most selective institutions in Tennessee are Vanderbilt University, Rhodes 
College, Sewanee, the University of the South, and the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. 
Students entering these institutions have an average high school GPA of 3.7, and an average 
ACT composite score of 29. Using this second definition, any student who was eligible to attend 
any of these four institutions but enrolled elsewhere will be considered undermatched.
7
 
Rodriguez refers to this as the “acceptance rate method.”  
Barron’s selectivity categories 
The third definition of undermatch considers Barron’s selectivity categories as a measure 
of institutional quality. Students are classified as undermatched if they enroll at an institution that 
is below the Barron’s category of an institution at which they are academically eligible to enroll. 
                                                             
6 Some debate surrounds the appropriateness of relying solely on high school GPA and/or 
standardized test scores to determine the college or university that is the best match for a student. 
Some contend that high school GPA is the preferred indicator, as it reflects non-cognitive, hard 
to measure student characteristics such as motivation (i.e., Bowen, et al., 2009). Others state that 
standardized test scores are more appropriate predictors of where students will be accepted and 
their academic success once they enroll (Bastedo & Jaquette, 2011; Bettinger, Evans, & Pope, 
2011). In light of this debate, I use both high school GPA and ACT composite score, as well as 
Barron’s selectivity rankings, to explore undermatch in Tennessee.  
7
 Using this definition, students who attend highly selective colleges or universities out-of-state 
are still considered to have undermatched, as they did not attend one of the most selective in-
state institutions. 
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For example, a student who earned a high school GPA of 3.5 and an ACT composite score of 30 
is eligible to attend a “Most Competitive” college or university. If he attends a “Highly 
Competitive” or a “Very Competitive” college or university, he will be classified as having 
undermatched. The definitions of each Barron’s selectivity category and the corresponding GPAs 
and ACT scores are presented in Table 3.4.  
Distance from mean GPA and ACT 
The fourth definition of undermatch classifies students as undermatched if their academic 
qualifications (high school GPA or ACT composite score) are higher than those of their peers, on 
average, at the institution they attend. Students are labeled as undermatched if their high school 
GPA is .25, .50, or 1 point higher than the mean GPA of their peers, or if they earned ACT 
scores that are 1.5 or 3 (one half or one standard deviation, respectively) or more points higher 
than the mean ACT score of the incoming class at the institution they attend. The objective of 
this definition is to determine “how undermatched” students are.  
Dillon and Smith (2017) 
The fifth definition of undermatch used in this paper is the definition created by Dillon 
and Smith (2017) to more fully account for student characteristics and institutional quality when 
exploring undermatch, rather than only students’ ACT scores and high school GPAs. This 
definition first ranks students’ academic achievement using their scores on the Armed Forces 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB; I use ACT scores when exploring this definition.) The 
authors then create and weight by student body size a college quality index using variables from 
the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) that reflect selectivity and 
resources available to the institution: mean SAT score of entering students, the percent of 
applicants rejected, the average salary of teaching faculty, and faculty-student ratio. As the index 
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is weighted by the number of students enrolled at each institution, students in the n
th
 percentile of 
ability should, in the case of “perfect match,” enroll in an institution in the n
th
 quality percentile. 
As such, students for whom the difference in percentile rankings is 20 or greater are considered 
to have undermatched. 
Data 
This study uses student-level administrative data for four cohorts of recent high school 
graduates in Tennessee (the graduating classes of 2010 through 2013) to explore the sensitivity 
of undermatch rates to different definitions of undermatch. These data are provided by the 
Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC), the state’s public higher education 
coordinating board, and the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC), the state’s 
financial aid granting agency. Variables provided by THEC include student demographic 
information (e.g., sex, race), academic qualifications (e.g., ACT score)
8
, and the higher education 
institution at which students enroll, as well as the mean ACT composite score and high school 
GPA of incoming freshmen classes at each public institution. Data provided by TSAC includes 
family adjusted gross income (AGI), expected family contribution (EFC), and whether a student 
is ever Pell grant eligible. 
Students’ high school GPAs are captured from two sources: cumulative GPAs that are 
self-reported on the ACT (most often during the junior year) and from TSAC, to which GPAs are 
reported by guidance counselors and audited by TSAC staff when students apply for state-
sponsored merit aid. As the latter source of this variable is audited and verified, data from TSAC 
are preferred. For students who do not apply for state-funded scholarships, however, this paper 
                                                             
8
 This study uses a student’s first ACT score, as opposed to his maximum score. This is because, 
as the ACT is universal and mandatory in Tennessee, all students have a first ACT score 
irrespective of their postsecondary aspirations. Students who take the ACT multiple times may 
have different preferences or aspirations for higher education relative to their peers who take the 
exam only once. 
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relies on the self-reported GPA from the ACT data ,which, per ACT, is accurate for 
approximately 85 percent of students who take the ACT (Sanchez & Buddin, 2015).
9
  
Data from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) is used to supplement data 
provided by THEC and TSAC, and to include in the sample high school graduates who do not 
enroll in a public college or university in Tennessee. This data accounts for those students who 
attend a private institution in Tennessee. The name, type (less-than-four or four-year institution), 
and Barron’s selectivity category of each institution are provided by the NSC.   
Sample 
The initial sample for this analysis (N = 139,824) is comprised of four recent cohorts of 
public high school graduates in Tennessee. Students are included in the sample only if they 
enroll in a college or university following high school, as the objective of this analysis is to 
investigate where students enroll, not whether they enroll.  
The sample is restricted to students who have a valid ACT composite score and high 
school GPA, as both ACT score and GPA will be used as indicators of academic undermatch. 
Because the ACT is universally administered in Tennessee, all students enrolled in public high 
schools should have taken the exam, regardless of their postsecondary aspirations. For this 
reason, very few students (less than 1 percent, N =41) are dropped from the sample due to a 
missing ACT score. Approximately 5 percent of the initial sample (N = 6,656) does not report a 
GPA on the ACT or have a GPA on record with the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation
10
, 
and are therefore dropped from the sample. The resulting sample is comprised of 133,127 recent 
graduates of public high schools in Tennessee who immediately enroll in higher education.  
                                                             
9
 The audited GPA provided by TSAC is used when students have a value for both audited and 
self-reported GPAs. 
10
 Students who do not apply for merit-based financial aid are not required to submit ACT scores 
or high school GPAs to TSAC. 
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Table 3.1 presents the sample descriptive statistics. Students are predominantly white 
(68.4 percent), and those who are black and Hispanic comprise 24.6 and 3.2 percent of the 
sample, respectively. The sample is 56.5 percent female. Approximately 46 percent of students 
in the sample are Pell eligible (47 percent at community and technical colleges; 44 percent at 
four-year institutions). The mean high school GPA is 3.19 (3.0 at community and technical 
colleges; 3.4 at four-year institutions), and the average composite ACT score is 20.9 (19.9 at 
community and technical colleges, 22.3 at four-year institutions).   
Approximately 55 percent of these high school graduates attend a community or technical 
college, while 45 percent attend a four-year college or university. Community and technical 
colleges in Tennessee are classified by Barron’s as Noncompetitive or Not Rated. More than 90 
percent of students who enroll in four-year institutions attend a college or university that has a 
Barron’s selectivity category of Less Competitive, Competitive, or Very Competitive. The 
remaining students (eight percent) are those who attend very selective (Highly and Most 
Competitive) institutions.  
Findings 
Roderick et al. (2009) 
Approximately 72 percent of students in the sample (N = 95,811) earned a high school 
GPA of 2.5 or greater, and an ACT score of 18 or higher. Per the definition of undermatch used 
by Roderick et al. (2009) and the academic qualifications to attend a four-year institution in 
Tennessee, each of these students is eligible to attend at least one in-state four-year college or 
university. Of these students, 47 percent (N = 45,224) did not enroll at a four-year institution, 
and instead enrolled at a community or technical college. Therefore, using this definition, 47 
percent of recent high school graduates in Tennessee have undermatched.  
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Relative to students who meet these academic qualifications and enroll in a four-year 
institution, undermatched students earned slightly lower average ACT composite scores (22.4 
versus 23.2; difference is significant at p<.05) and slightly average high school GPAs (3.43 
versus 3.46; difference is statistically insignificant). Further, 51 percent of undermatched 
students are Pell eligible. While no substantial difference exists with regard to the proportion of 
nonwhite “matched” versus undermatched students, this finding suggests that lower income 
students are more likely than their more affluent peers to undermatch, a conclusion that mirrors 
prior research.   
Bowen et al. (2009) 
Approximately six percent of the sample (N = 8,305) earned a high school GPA of 3.7 or 
higher, and an ACT score of 29 or higher, the necessary academic criteria to attend one of the 
four most selective colleges and universities in Tennessee. Of these students, only 31 percent 
attended Vanderbilt University, Rhodes College, Sewanee, the University of the South, and the 
University of Tennessee at Knoxville. Using this definition, 69 percent of recent high school 
graduates in Tennessee who were academically eligible but did not attend the most selective 
colleges and universities in the state, have undermatched.  
 Given the narrowness of this definition, this rate is artificially high relative to undermatch 
rates calculated using less restrictive definitions. This definition disregards issues of capacity (do 
these four institutions have the space and resources to serve every academically eligible 
student?) or students’ choice to attend out-of-state colleges. However, this definition remains 
relevant, as the findings of Bowen et al. (2009) are regularly cited in both policymaking and 
higher education, generating a call for action to combat undermatch.  
Barron’s selectivity categories 
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Approximately 59 percent of students (N = 78,555) attended a college or university that 
is classified by Barron’s as at least one category below their appropriate academic match or 
enrolled in a non-ranked community or technical college. This undermatch rate is driven 
primarily by a large number of high achieving students enrolling at a community or technical 
college, most of which are unrated by Barron’s.
11
 Primarily, students who are lower income and 
in the middle of the GPA (2.0 – 3.0) and ACT distributions (24 – 28) are those who undermatch 
using this definition.  
Distance from mean GPA and ACT 
Approximately 56 percent of students in the sample (N = 74,551) earned high school 
GPAs that are 0.25 or more points above the mean GPA of the incoming class at the institution 
they attend.
12
 Increasing the cutoff to 0.50 points or more decreases the rate of undermatch to 49 
percent (N = 65,232). Twenty-one percent of students (N = 27,956) earned high school GPAs 
that are greater than or equal to 1 point higher than the mean GPA of the incoming class at the 
institution at which they enroll.  
The majority of these undermatched students are enrolled in community colleges, 
primarily those in east Tennessee that often serve students who intend to transfer to a local four-
year institution (i.e., Pellissippi State Community College in Knoxville, Tennessee and 
Chattanooga State Community College in Chattanooga, Tennessee) Further, community colleges 
in Tennessee serve a more diverse study body, which contributes to the large variation in GPAs. 
Of those who undermatch by 1 GPA point or greater, the majority (more than 80 percent) are 
                                                             
11 Tennessee Achieves, a regional program and precursor to the statewide Tennessee Promise 
program that provides free tuition at community and technical colleges may contribute to these 
enrollment patterns. This policy will be invested more fully in Chapter 5. 
12 Average ACT and GPA, as discussed with regard to this definition, is the four year average 
(2010-2013) academic qualifications of entering freshmen, as calculated by the Tennessee 
Higher Education Commission in its annual Higher Education Factbook. 
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nonwhite and Pell eligible – again, it is students of color from lower income households who 
undermatch at higher rates relative to their white, higher income peers.  
Undermatch rates using ACT composite scores yields a similar finding. Approximately 
60 percent of students (N = 79,876) attend a college or university at which their ACT composite 
score is 1.5 points (approximately one-half a standard deviation) above the mean ACT score of 
their peers. 38 percent of students (N = 50,588) earned an ACT composite score that is 3 points 
(1 standard deviation) higher than the mean. Again, it is the community colleges, particularly 
those mentioned above, that have the greater degree of variation in the ACT scores of those who 
enrolled during this time.
13
  
Considering both the GPA and ACT indicators of undermatch, one can use this definition 
to assert that 21 to 60 percent of recent high school graduates in Tennessee undermatch, 
depending on the distance from average academic indicators considered. Related to the above-
mentioned discussion of whether GPAs or ACT scores are better metrics for measuring 
undermatch, for this sample, these two indicators yield fairly similar results.  
Dillon and Smith (2017) 
The difference between students’ ability rankings and the institutional quality index is 20 
percentile points or greater for approximately 26 percent of the sample (N = 34,613). Using this 
definition, therefore, these students have undermatched. Similar to the definitions of undermatch 
discussed above, these students are primarily those who enrolled in a community or technical 
college, and are predominately nonwhite and lower income.  
                                                             
13
 The distributions of high school GPAs and ACT scores are left-skewed among this sample of 
first-time freshmen enrollees, bringing down the mean such that a large proportion of students 
earned GPAs and ACT scores higher than the mean at each institution. This may be due in part 
to economic conditions during this time: as Tennessee, like the rest of the United States, was 
emerging from a recession during 2010 and 2011, higher achieving students may have opted for 
less expensive, less selective institutions than those they were eligible to attend. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, this definition yields the second lowest estimate of undermatch. 
This is perhaps because many institutions in Tennessee are lower quality than other institutions 
nationwide, when considering average student achievement and institutional resources (both 
those included in this index and those discussed in Chapter 1). Further, students in Tennessee, 
relative to their peers nationwide, score lower on the ACT – a statewide average of 19,  two 
points lower than the national average of 21 (THEC, 2014). As such, it may be that there is a 
better match between students and institutions in Tennessee relative to other states, when using 
Dillon and Smith’s definition of undermatch.  
Discussion 
The five definitions of undermatch applied to one sample of recent high school graduates 
in Tennessee yield estimates of undermatch ranging from 21 to 69 percent of students, depending 
on the definition used. These rates are, clearly, very different. The objective of this analysis was 
to emphasize the need for researchers and policymakers to explicitly define what undermatch is 
prior to making sweeping conclusions about the prevalence of this phenomenon.     
Table 3.2 outlines each definition of undermatch used in this paper, and the 
corresponding rate of undermatch. The lowest undermatch rates (21 and 26 percent) are the 
result of definitions accounting for entering students’ mean GPAs and more fully for institutional 
quality as well as student ability, while the highest (69 percent) is due to an extremely broad 
definition of what it means to undermatch. A difference of 47 percentage points emphasizes the 
need to define undermatch very explicitly before structuring policies and programs, at the state, 
local, and institutional levels, to combat this issue. 
Irrespective of the definition of undermatch, it is students who are nonwhite and low 
income who undermatch at rates higher than their white, more affluent peers. This is consistent 
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with the findings of prior literature, which conclude that these student groups often undermatch 
due to poor information about the college and financial aid application processes, as well as the 
costs of college (i.e., Ikenberry & Hartle, 1998; Bowen et al., 2009; Hoxby & Avery, 2003; 
Roderick et al., 2009; Scott-Clayton, 2012; Smith, et al., 2013).  
The state of Tennessee is working to encourage and support high achieving students who 
are nonwhite and lower income to attend selective colleges and universities throughout the state. 
UBS Financial Services has partnered with the Tennessee College Access and Success Network 
(TCASN) to provide college counseling and financial aid to college-bound students identified by 
their high schools as being “at risk” for undermatching (i.e., those students who are high 
achieving, nonwhite, and graduates of low performing high schools). Also, the office of 
Governor Bill Haslam recently launched AdviseTN, a college advising corps that places college 
counselors in high schools that serve low income and primarily nonwhite students. These 
advisors will assist students with the college and financial aid search and application processes, 
as well as help to build a college-going culture in the high schools, to increase each school’s 
college going rate and encourage appropriate academic matches for students.  
Additionally, no matter the definition, students who undermatch in Tennessee often 
attend a community or technical college rather than a four-year institution, perhaps due to lower 
costs or proximity to home. This finding is particularly timely due to a number of initiatives in 
Tennessee – particularly the Tennessee Promise, which provides tuition-free community or 
technical college to recent high school graduates – that incentivize students to attend a two-year 
or technical college. While the objective of this program is to encourage students who had not 
intended to do so to enroll in higher education, an unintended consequence may be that higher 
achieving students choose to enroll in a less-than-four year institution, resulting in undermatch. 
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Also, beginning in Fall 2015, the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) award 
amount increased by 50 percent (from $2,000 to $3,000 for a full time student) for those who 
enroll in a community college. As the TELS program is a merit-based scholarship, it remains to 
be seen whether high achieving students will begin attending community colleges at higher rates, 
as the purchasing power of this scholarship is increased. While one of the stated objectives of 
both the Tennessee Promise and the TELS programs is to increase student access to higher 
education, these initiatives may inadvertently increase undermatch throughout the state.  
Limitations 
 This study employs a dataset that includes only students who enroll in higher education 
(public or private) in Tennessee. While it is only approximately 7 percent of high school 
graduates who enroll in out-of-state institutions (THEC, 2016) including the enrollment 
decisions of these students will provide a more robust discussion of undermatch in Tennessee. 
Tennessee is bordered by eight states, and it is therefore important to explore more fully whether 
students are crossing the border into neighboring states to attend an institution that is a better 
academic match. Additionally, earlier versions of this paper included “did not enroll at all” as a 
definition of undermatch. It is likely that some portion of the students who were flagged as not 
having enrolled did so out of state. Including data from out-of-state institutions, therefore, reduce 
bias in the estimates of undermatch presented above. 
 Further, there are many additional ways in which to define undermatch; this paper is by 
no means exhaustive in its discussion of only five definitions. There is much opportunity for 
further exploration of this topic, particularly when considering institutional quality more 
holistically (i.e., modifying and creating indices in the spirit of Dillon and Smith (2017)) rather 
than relying solely on students’ academic characteristics.  
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Conclusion 
Student undermatch continues to be an issue of concern to educators and policymakers, 
both in Tennessee and nationwide. It is important that as researchers discuss their findings with 
these groups, they are clear and explicit about what undermatch means in the context of the work 
they are presenting. Further, it is imperative that programs and initiatives continue to combat 
increased rates of undermatch among students who are nonwhite and low income, so these 
students can access the benefits inherent in attending and graduating from a selective college or 
university.  
The effects of recent higher education initiatives in Tennessee, some of which were 
discussed above, on undermatch rates remains to be seen. While the intentions of these programs 
is increase access and affordability, only time will tell if the effects on student decision-making 
cause high-achieving students to attend lower quality, less selective institutions, leading to 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics – Recent High School Graduates in Tennessee 
(N = 133,127) 
  
 






2 year - 
Mean 
2 year -  
SD 
Race (Mutually Exclusive)     
     American Indian .002  .002  
     Asian .027  .013  
     Black .246  .174  
     Hispanic .032  .027  
     White .626  .732  
     Multiracial .032  .015  
 Sex     
     Male .449  .420  
     Female    .551  .570  
Pell Eligible  .440  .470  
Enroll in College .448  .552  
GPA 3.35 .535 3.06 .684 
ACT Composite Score 22.30 4.27 19.9 4.44 
Barron’s Rankings     
Noncompetitive   .558  
Less Competitive .021    
Competitive    .338    
Very Competitive .125    
Highly Competitive .065    
Most Competitive .001    










1. Students with ACT≥18 and GPA ≥2.5 
who are eligible to attend a 4-year college 
or university, but attend a less-than-4-year 
institution.  
47 
2. Students with ACT≥29 and GPA≥3.7 
who are eligible to attend one of the four 
most selective institutions in Tennessee, but 
do not. 
69 
3. Students who attend a college or 
university that is one or more Barron's 
category lower than an appropriate 
academic match. 
59 
4a. Student's high school GPA is 0.25 
points higher than the mean GPA at the 
institution he attends. 
56 
4b. Student's high school GPA is 0.5 points 
higher than the mean GPA at the institution 
he attends. 
49 
4c. Student's high school GPA is 1 point 
higher than the mean GPA at the institution 
he attends. 
21 
4d. Student's ACT composite is 1.5 points 
(.5 standard deviation) higher than the mean 
ACT score at the institution he attends. 
60 
4e. Student's ACT composite is 3 points (1 
standard deviation) higher than the mean 
ACT score at the institution he attends. 
38 
5. Student's ACT percentile differs from his 
student body-weighted institutional quality 
















 High School GPA 
  <2.0 2.0-2.4 2.5-2.9 3.0-3.4 3.5-4.3 
No ACT 2-year Less selective 4-year Less selective 4-year Less selective 4-year Selective 4-year 
<18 2-year Less selective 4-year Less selective 4-year Less selective 4-year Selective 4-year 
18-20 Less selective 4-year Less selective 4-year Less selective 4-year Selective 4-year Selective 4-year 
21-23 Less selective 4-year Less selective 4-year Selective 4-year Selective 4-year Selective 4-year 
24 + Less selective 4-year Selective 4-year Selective 4-year Selective 4-year Selective 4-year 
Adapted from Roderick, et al., 2009 
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Table 3.4. Description of Institution Selectivity Groupings and Ratings 
 
Ratings Grouping Used 




Admit fewer than 33 percent of applicants. Average freshman: 
Top 10-20 percent of high school class; GPA of 3.3 or higher; 
ACT of 29 or higher 
Highly Competitive 
Admit 33-50 percent of applicants. Average freshman: Top 20-
35 percent of high school class; GPA of 3.0-3.3; ACT of 27 or 
28. 
Very Competitive 
Admit 50-75 percent of applicants. Average freshman: Top 35-
50 percent of high school class; GPA of 2.7-3.0; ACT score of 
24, 25, or 26. 
Less selective 4-year 
institution 
Competitive 
Admit 75-85 percent of applicants. Average freshman: Top 65 
percent of high school class; GPA of 2.0-2.7; ACT below 21 
Less Competitive 
Admit 85 percent or more of applicants. Average freshman: 
Top 65 percent of high school class; GPA below a 2.0; ACT 
below 21 
Noncompetitive 
Students must have graduated from an accredited high school 
with minimum high school requirements. Colleges with higher 
than a 98 percent admittance rate are automatically in this 
category.  
Other Not rated by Barron's 
2-year institution n/a Not rated by Barron's 






Matching the Best and Brightest to the Best Institutions?  




The Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program provides merit-based financial 
aid to high achieving high school graduates in Tennessee. Using student-level data including six 
cohorts of recent high school graduates provided by the Tennessee Higher Education 
Commission (THEC) and Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC), this paper uses a 
regression discontinuity design to explore the effects of the General Assembly Merit Scholarship 
(GAMS), one of three TELS award types, on academic undermatch. Students just over the 
threshold for GAMS receipt are more likely than their non-GAMS peers to undermatch, perhaps 
due to the increased buying power of this award at less-selective public institutions across the 










The effects of statewide merit aid programs on student outcomes have been researched at 
length, and the three scholarships that comprise the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship 
(TELS) program are no exception (i.e., Pallais, 2009; Bruce & Carruthers, 2014; Tennessee 
Higher Education Commission [THEC], 2016). While the effects of the TELS program on 
enrollment, persistence, and degree completion have been previously explored, there is a deficit 
of knowledge about this program as a contributor to or deterrent of student match. High 
achieving students may choose to enroll at less-selective institutions than those at which they are 
eligible to attend due to having received a TELS award (i.e., Cohodes and Goodman, 2014). As 
such, the likelihood of undermatch among these students is increased. Alternatively, students on 
the margin of attending a two-year institution may instead enroll at a four-year institution as the 
cost of doing so is reduced (i.e., Dynarski, 2000). While this may result in a student attending a 
higher quality institution, it is possible he is academically overmatched relative to his peers at 
this institution.  
The objective of this chapter is to determine the effect of scholarship receipt on 
undermatch among the highest achieving scholarship recipients, exploring whether treatment 
effects differ between students who receive a General Assembly Merit Scholarship (GAMS) 
award versus those who receive a less prestigious, less lucrative Tennessee HOPE scholarship. 
These awards will be described at length in the Program Description section below. I aim to 
reconcile the findings of Bruce and Carruthers (2014) and Cohodes and Goodman (2014) in their 
prior work on the TELS program and the John and Abigail Adams Scholarship Program in 
Massachusetts, respectively, to determine whether a student’s likelihood of undermatch varies by 
the type of award (and its amount) he or she receives.  
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Contribution and Research Questions 
 This chapter contributes to the body of statewide merit aid literature by discussing the 
GAMS program as a contributor to a student’s likelihood of undermatch. I will explore whether 
students receiving GAMS awards, awarded to the highest achieving high school graduates in the 
state, are more likely to undermatch than their middle-achieving peers. As such, conclusions 
drawn from this work will shed light on the effects of this program on the enrollment decisions 
of Tennessee’s “best and brightest” students. 
 This analysis also updates and expands the work of Bruce and Carruthers (2014) by 
analyzing a sample of more recent, post-recession high school graduates: the graduating high 
school classes of 2009-2014. Further, as data provided by the Tennessee Student Assistance 
Corporation (TSAC) include students are who GAMS recipients, rather than those who are 
GAMS-eligible, this study employs a sharp regression discontinuity design, as opposed to the 
fuzzy regression discontinuity design used by Bruce and Carruthers (2014). Also, due to 
increases in tuition during this time period, merit aid awards in Tennessee covered approximately 
50 percent of tuition and fees at community colleges and public universities (THEC, 2016), a 
substantial reduction from approximately 75 percent during the time period discussed in Bruce 
and Carruthers (2014). I will therefore consider whether the reduction in buying power 
contributes to students’ college-going decisions and subsequent match. 
 In addition, my research paper contributes to ongoing policy conversations among 
legislators and executive leadership in Tennessee about the function of the statewide merit aid 
program. As new statewide financial aid programs (i.e., the Tennessee Promise free community 
and technical college initiative) are universal and are structured to incentivize enrollment at less-
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than-four year institutions, it is critical to more fully understand the effects of this program – 
particularly the GAMS award - on high achieving students’ postsecondary enrollment decisions.   
 I will address the following research questions: 
1. Does a student’s likelihood of undermatch vary by TELS award (i.e., GAMS versus 
Tennessee HOPE) received? 
2. Does a student’s likelihood of undermatch vary by the definition of undermatch 
employed? 
I hypothesize that students with scores just above the ACT threshold for GAMS 
scholarship eligibility (an ACT composite score of 29) are more likely to undermatch than their 
peers who fall just short of receiving a GAMS award. This may be due to the award’s increased 
buying power at less-selective institutions across the state. Further, I hypothesize that these “best 
and brightest” students’ likelihood of undermatch will vary based on the definition of 
undermatch.  
Prior Literature 
Bruce and Carruthers (2014) 
Bruce and Carruthers (2014) employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to determine 
the effect of the TELS program on the enrollment decisions among students on the margin of 
TELS eligibility. They conclude that while TELS receipt has a negligible effect on students’ 
decisions to enroll in public versus private or in- versus out-of-state institutions, students just 
above the TELS eligibility threshold are more likely to attend a four-year institution than their 
peers just below the cut off. As such, eligible students attend four-year institutions with higher 
graduation rates, increased resources per pupil, and higher Carnegie classifications than the two-
year institutions they would have attended (Bruce & Carruthers, 2014). This substitution between 
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two- and four-year institutions is particularly prominent among low income TELS recipients, 
who are more sensitive to price than their higher income peers (Bruce & Carruthers, 2014). 
These findings mirror those of other research investigating statewide merit aid programs (i.e., 
Dynarski, 2000; Zhang, Hu, Sun, & Pu, 2016). 
Cohodes and Goodman (2014) 
Cohodes and Goodman (2014) also use a regression discontinuity design to investigate 
the effects of the Adams Scholarship, a statewide merit aid program in Massachusetts, on the 
quality of institutions at which recipients enroll. They determine that recipients (students in the 
top 25 percent of their graduating high school class) attended colleges and universities with 
considerably lower per pupil funding and graduation rates, relative to their similar-achieving 
peers attending a non-Adams Scholarship eligible institution. Further, students using Adams 
Scholarships attended institutions with lower average academic achievement (i.e., mean SAT 
scores among entering freshmen) increasing the incidence of undermatch among those who take 
up this scholarship (Cohodes & Goodman, 2014). 
Program Description: Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship 
Program history 
The Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program is Tennessee’s statewide 
merit aid program, providing middle-dollar scholarships (packaged after Pell and state need-
based grant aid, but prior to institutional aid or community-based scholarships) to high school 
graduates on the basis of their high school grade point averages (GPAs) and ACT composite 
scores. Since its implementation in Fall 2004, the TELS program has awarded scholarships to 
approximately 70,000 students each year, at a cost of over $300 million annually (THEC, 2016). 
TELS awards can be applied to the cost of attendance at any public or private not-for-profit two- 
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or four-year institution in Tennessee.
14
 The TELS program requires that students file the Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and complete an online scholarship application.  
The TELS program was modeled after existing statewide merit aid programs across the 
southeastern United States; in particular, the Georgia Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally 
(HOPE) scholarship program. Governor Phil Bredesen (D-Nashville) and the Tennessee General 
Assembly established the TELS program in 2002 with four broadly-stated objectives:  
1. Provide access to postsecondary education for Tennesseans 
2. Improve high school and postsecondary achievement 
3. Keep the best and brightest students in Tennessee 
4. Provide social and economic benefits to the state (THEC, 2016)  
While the Tennessee Education Lottery funds eleven scholarships, three large programs 
comprise the “TELS Program,” and account for over 70 percent of all grant aid dollars disbursed 
by the state: the Tennessee HOPE scholarship, the General Assembly Merit Scholarship 
(GAMS), and the Aspire scholarship. When referring to “TELS awards” or the “TELS program” 
above and throughout this paper, I am referring only to these three scholarship programs.  
Each award provides a different dollar amount, and is available to students who meet 
specific academic and socioeconomic criteria. Receipt and retention criteria are consistent from 
2009-2014, the time period of this study (THEC, 2016). 
Scholarship types 
Tennessee HOPE scholarship. The majority (64 percent) of TELS recipients receive a 
HOPE award, which during this time provided $4,000 each year to a student enrolling full time 
                                                             
14
 Students enrolling at for-profit institutions operating in Tennessee are not eligible for TELS 




at a four-year institution and $2,000 each year for enrolling full time at a community college.
15
 
To receive a HOPE award, students must earn a composite score of 21 or higher on the ACT or a 
cumulative high school GPA of 3.0 or higher.  
General Assembly Merit Scholarship (GAMS). The GAMS award, the objective of 
which is to keep the “best and brightest” students in-state, requires that students earn a 29 or 
higher on the ACT and a cumulative high school GPA of 3.75 or higher. This award is $5,000 
annually for a full time student at a four-year college or university; $2,500 annually for a full 
time student at a two-year institution. 
Aspire award. The Aspire award combines both merit- and need-based aid for students 
with a family adjusted gross income (AGI) of $36,000 or less. The criteria for receipt are 
identical to the HOPE award. This award provides $5,500 annually for full time university 
enrollment and $2,750 annually for full time community college enrollment.  
 Award receipt. Table 4.1 summarizes award amounts and receipt criteria for each of 
these three scholarship programs. Students can receive only one scholarship type, and will 
receive the maximum award for which they are eligible. For example, a student with an ACT 
composite score of 30 and a high school GPA of 4.0 will receive a GAMS award, while his peer 
who has an ACT score of 27 and a 4.0 high school GPA will receive a HOPE award. Students 
who do not meet both the ACT and GPA criteria for a GAMS award will receive a HOPE 
scholarship, as the HOPE requires an ACT score of 21 or a 3.0 high school GPA, whereas the 
GAMS award requires an ACT score of 29 and a 3.75 GPA. If a student is identified as low 
income (family AGI of $36,000 or less) he will receive an Aspire award, whether he is eligible 
for a HOPE or GAMS award. This is because the Aspire award amount is higher than both the 
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 All TELS awards are pro-rated based on enrollment intensity. Students are not required to 
enroll full time to receive a TELS award.  
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HOPE or GAMS awards. Unless a student chooses to pursue higher education out-of-state or 
attend a technical college or proprietary institution in Tennessee, there is no reason he would turn 
down this award.    
Data 
This study employs student-level data for six cohorts of recent high school graduates in 
Tennessee: the classes of 2009 through 2014. These data are provided by the Tennessee Higher 
Education Commission (THEC), the state’s public higher education coordinating board, and the 
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC), Tennessee’s financial aid granting agency. 
Variables provided by THEC include student demographics (e.g., sex, race), academic 
qualifications (e.g., ACT score, high school GPA), the higher education institution at which a 
student enrolls, and his enrollment intensity (full- or part-time). Data collected from TSAC 
include TELS award type and amount disbursed to each student, students’ family adjusted gross 
income (AGI), expected family contribution (EFC), and Pell eligibility.  
While students may qualify for HOPE because of their ACT score or high school GPA, 
this paper relies solely on ACT scores to identify students who received HOPE awards. This 
follows the strategy used by Bruce and Carruthers (2014) and is due to a data quality issue: the 
Tennessee Department of Education and THEC do not collect high school GPAs; therefore, 
GPAs provided to TSAC are self-reported, often by students themselves or high school guidance 
counselors. High school GPAs are missing for 30 percent of students in the sample. This is most 
often because when a student is determined to be HOPE-eligible based on his ACT score (the 
“first pass” at eligibility), GPAs are not reported to TSAC. However, more than 80 percent of 





 Using ACT as the forcing variable to identify HOPE recipients, therefore, will 
still allow for a robust exploration of the effects of HOPE on student match. This data limitation 
is not relevant to GAMS recipients, as they are required to hit both an ACT and GPA 




The sample for this analysis is comprised of 63,288 high school graduates from the 
classes of 2009-2014 who received HOPE or GAMS awards. Students in the sample enroll 
seamlessly into higher education following high school graduation, and are enrolled full time.
18
 
Sample descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.2. Students who received Aspire awards are 
excluded from the sample: though the criteria for receipt are identical to HOPE awards, the 
Aspire award amount is 37 percent ($1,500) higher than the HOPE award, which may lead to 
different decision making among recipients. Students who earned a 29 on the ACT but did not 
meet the high school GPA requirement for GAMS receipt (N = 2,799; approximately three 
percent of the sample) are eligible for HOPE awards, but are excluded from the sample as ACT 
is the forcing variable in this analysis. 
Approximately 52 percent of HOPE recipients are female, whereas only 43 percent of 
GAMS recipients are female. Recipients of both scholarships are predominately white: 84.4 
percent of HOPE recipients and 88.3 percent of GAMS recipients. GAMS students are higher 
income than their peers who receive HOPE awards, as 22.2 percent are Pell eligible, relative to 
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 Students who quality for HOPE awards on their high school GPA only (approximately 18 
percent of the sample; N = ~32,000) are excluded from this analysis. 
17
 GPAs are self-reported or reported by the high school guidance counselors. GPAs of GAMS 
recipients are audited and high schools are required to provide student transcripts to provide 
evidence of students’ GPAs.  
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 The sample is limited to students enrolled full time to ensure that each HOPE and GAMS 




30.5 percent of HOPE recipients. The median ACT score among HOPE (GAMS) students is a 23 
(30), and the median high school GPA among those reported is 3.54 (3.96 – all GPAs are 
reported). The distribution of ACT scores among students in this sample is presented in Figure 
4.1.  
Methodology 
This study employs a sharp regression discontinuity design to determine the effect of 
GAMS and HOPE receipt on undermatch, using the two definitions of undermatch discussed in 
the Definitions section below. Because the data provided by the Tennessee Student Assistance 
Corporation reflects award receipt, a sharp design is appropriate, and the treatment effects 
calculated are treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates. This is because the ACT cutoff score 
(29) perfectly predicts assignment to treatment (GAMS receipt) in this sample, and will allow me 
to evaluate the effect of GAMS receipt on students who take up the scholarship, rather than those 
who are eligible based on their ACT scores and high school GPAs. 
To explore the effects of the GAMS program, it is improbable that state leadership in 
Tennessee would ever allow for a randomized controlled trial. Because GAMS is a state-funded 
financial aid program, it would be difficult to justify (politically) why some eligible students 
receive this award while others do not. The next best option for this analysis, therefore, is a 
regression discontinuity design that exploits the scholarship eligibility discontinuity at an ACT 
score of 29. Further, the design is a sharp regression discontinuity as there is perfect compliance 
between scholarship eligibility and scholarship receipt in this sample. This is because, as a state-
sponsored financial aid program, financial aid officers do not have any authority to use 
professional judgement when making GAMS awards to students. Figure 4.2 depicts the 
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likelihood of receiving a GAMS award, by ACT score. It is clear from this figure that GAMS 
awards are disbursed only to those students who are academically eligible.      
To confirm whether a regression discontinuity design is valid, I conduct a McCrary 
(2008) density test to ensure that there is no evidence of sorting at the cut score. If students were 
able to manipulate their GAMS receipt (treatment status) there may be a cluster of observations 
right above or right below the ACT cutoff. Figure 4.3 depicts results of the McCrary test, which 
indicate that this type of sorting did not occur.  
Estimation 
Equation (1) provides a description of the parametric regression (a linear probability 
model) used to estimate the probability of undermatch among those receiving a GAMS award: 
𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑋1 + 𝐵2(𝐺𝐴𝑀𝑆) + 𝑒             (1) 
where UMit is student i’s probability of undermatch in year t, X1 is a vector of student 
characteristics (e.g., sex, race, Pell eligibility), GAMS is a binary indicator (0/1) measuring 
whether the student is a GAMS recipient or not, and e is the error term. This identification 
strategy relies on the discontinuity that exists at an ACT score of 29, at which point students in 
the sample are eligible for a GAMS award. Student-level control variables found to be relevant 
to undermatch in prior literature investigating this issue (e.g., race, Pell eligibility) are included 
to improve the model’s precision. The same is true in Equation (2) below.  
 Regression discontinuity designs are commonly operationalized in two ways: 1) focusing 
on the discontinuity itself to depict the treatment effect as the relationship between treatment and 
outcomes (Hahn, Todd, & van der Klaauw, 2001) or 2) assuming random assignment (“local 
randomization”) around the discontinuity, in which case the treatment effects are the difference 
in means on each side of the cutoff (Lee & Card, 2008). Whereas the former relies on accurately 
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specifying the model’s functional form, the latter relies on determining the correct bandwidth 
and bin widths such that estimates are accurate (Hahn, et al., 2001, Lee & Card, 2008). The local 
average treatment effects (LATE) yielded from the second strategy are particularly relevant to 
state-level policymaking in Tennessee. This is because each year, numerous state representatives 
introduce legislation to change the ACT cutoffs for HOPE and GAMS receipt by a few points. 
As such, the LATE estimates of the GAMS program’s influence on undermatch, though they are 
not widely generalizable, are quite useful.  
I use both parametric (Equation (1)) and nonparametric strategies to estimate the effect of 
GAMS receipt on students’ likelihood of undermatch. Equation (2) below presents the 
nonparametric (linear probability model) estimating equation: 
𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑋1 + 𝐵2(𝐺𝐴𝑀𝑆) + 𝑓(𝐴𝐶𝑇) + 𝑒              (2) 
where UMit is a student’s probability of undermatch in year t, X1 is a vector of student 
characteristics (i.e., sex, race, Pell eligibility), GAMS is a binary indicator (0/1) for whether the 
student is a GAMS recipient, f(ACT) is a function of the assignment variable (ACT composite 
score) and e is the error term.   
 To account for any nonlinearity in the relationship between GAMS receipt and 
undermatch, polynomial and interaction terms are included when estimating Equation (2). 
Results from the inclusion of these terms are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Measures of fit 
(i.e., F-test and AIC values) are used to determine the optimal model specification, which for this 
analysis is a quadratic function (lowest AIC; F-test p-value < 0.05; referent is linear model). 
To confirm the estimates of undermatch produced using the quadratic function identified 
above, a bandwidth is selected in which to conduct a local linear regression around the cut score. 
Whereas a narrow bandwidth will yield less biased estimates of the effect of GAMS on 
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undermatch, these estimates introduce higher variance than those predicted using a larger 
bandwidth, due to a smaller number of observations closer to the ACT cut off (Jacob, Zhu, 
Somers, & Bloom, 2012). Estimates calculated using larger bandwidths have less variance, but 
may also be biased. Determining the appropriate bandwidth, therefore, is often a tradeoff 
between bias and variance. A range of bandwidths is presented in Table 4.5. The preferred 
bandwidth is 4, which is calculated using the “plug in” procedure (i.e., Imbens & Kalyanaraman, 
2012). This is comparable to the bandwidth used by Bruce and Carruthers (2014) in their 
exploration of the TELS program in 2014.  
Definitions of undermatch 
Two of the undermatch definitions discussed in Chapter 3 are used to investigate the 
effects of GAMS receipt on undermatch. As this paper’s sample is comprised of Tennessee’s 
“best and brightest” high school graduates, the first definition of undermatch mirrors that of 
Bowen and colleagues (2009) in Crossing the Finish Line. GAMS recipients who do not attend 
one of the four most selective higher education institutions in the state – Rhodes College, 
Sewanee, the University of the South, the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, and Vanderbilt 
University - are classified as undermatched.  
The second definition is that used by Dillon and Smith (2017) to more fully account for 
institutional resources and college quality. I calculate students’ ACT score percentile and 
replicate Dillon and Smith’s four-factor index of college quality, using mean ACT composite 
scores, admission rates, faculty salaries and faculty-student ratios to measure institutional 
quality.
19
 When the difference between the ACT and college quality percentiles is 20 or greater, 
the student is labeled as having undermatched.  
                                                             
19
 Dillon and Smith construct a six-factor index for institutions (less-selective four-year and most 
two-year institutions) that do not report standardized test scores. As all institutions receiving 
101 
 
These two definitions are the most relevant when exploring the enrollment behavior of 
these high achieving students. Very few GAMS recipients enroll in community colleges (THEC, 
2016), so the Roderick et al. (2009) definition (enrolling in a two-year when eligible to enroll in 
a four-year institution) does not provide valuable new information. Further, there is not much 
variation in Barron’s selectivity categories among institutions across Tennessee, particularly 
when considering the institutions attended by high achieving students. And, as will be discussed 
at length in the Conclusion, distance from an institution’s incoming class’s average ACT or GPA 
would yield astronomical estimates of undermatch, as the academic achievement of GAMS 
recipients is well above the institution averages.  
Results 
Four most selective institutions 
GAMS recipients in this sample are .11 probability points
20
 more likely than their peers 
who receive Tennessee HOPE scholarships to undermatch, when undermatch is defined as 
failing to attend one of the four most selective higher education institutions in the state. This 
parametric estimate is presented in Table 4.3, and is consistent with the nonparametric estimates 
displayed in Table 4.5.  
While considering only the four most selective institutions in the state is a very narrow 
definition of undermatch (as discussed in Chapter 3) it speaks to both institutional capacity and 
affordability. With the exception of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, the total first year 
enrollment at the other three highly selective institutions is smaller than the number of students 
receiving a GAMS award each year. As such, if every GAMS recipient attended Rhodes College, 
Sewanee, the University of the South or Vanderbilt University, there would not be enough spots 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
TELS dollars are required to report mean ACT scores to THEC, this data is available for all 
institutions in the sample. For this reason, I replicate the four-factor index. 
20
 All estimates are presented as estimated probability points (“p-hats”). 
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in the total freshman class for them to do so. Also, as the sticker tuition price at the three private 
institutions in this choice set is three to five times that of the University of Tennessee at 
Knoxville (THEC, 2016) and even more compared to other less-selective public colleges and 
universities, high achieving students may choose to take their GAMS dollars to an institution at 
which the buying power is greater. 
Subgroup treatment effects 
Sex. Using this definition, male students who receive GAMS awards are .05 probability 
points more likely than female GAMS recipients to undermatch. While the magnitude of this 
difference is not as substantial as the differences between racial and income groups presented 
below, this difference between male and female GAMS recipients is statistically significant (p < 
.01).  
Race. Nonwhite GAMS recipients are .20 probability points more likely to undermatch 
by not attending one of the four most selective institutions in the state compared to their white 
peers who receive GAMS awards. This finding is consistent with the literature explored in 
Chapter 2 regarding the increased likelihood of nonwhite students undermatching compared to 
their white peers. Though these scholarship recipients are very high achieving, this finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that nonwhite students frequently struggle with the college search 
and application processes, leading to a large increase in the likelihood of undermatch relative to 
their white peers.  
Pell.: Pell-eligible GAMS recipients are .25 probability points more likely than their non-
Pell peers who receive GAMS to undermatch. This is similar to the finding above with respect to 
nonwhite students, and is aligned with prior research on this topic. As Pell-eligible students may 
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hesitate to attend a very selective, very expensive institution due to concerns about affordability, 
they instead attend less selective, more affordable institutions, resulting in undermatch. 
Robustness check. To examine the robustness of these findings and to further confirm 
the model specification, I drop observations in the tails of the ACT distribution to determine 
whether estimates of undermatch change substantially. The robustness check for this definition 
of undermatch is presented in Table 4.6. The estimates presented in this table confirm that a 
quadratic functional form is best fitting, and that the results are robust to removing extreme 
observations.  
Dillon and Smith (2017) 
GAMS recipients are .23 probability points more likely than their peers who receive 
Tennessee HOPE scholarships to undermatch, when undermatch is defined using a more 
complete measure of institutional quality. Dillon and Smith’s (2017) definition of undermatch 
accounts not only for students’ academic abilities relative to their peers, but considers 
institutional resources as well. This parametric estimate is presented in Table 4.4, and is 
consistent with the nonparametric estimates displayed in Table 4.5.  
 GAMS award recipients who undermatch when using this definition are more likely to 
attend institutions that are not as well-resourced as those they are eligible to attend. As above, 
this may be because students attend less-selective, less expensive institutions at which their 
GAMS award will cover a greater proportion of the cost of attendance.  As discussed throughout 
this dissertation, attending lower quality, less-selective institutions has implications for academic 
achievement, persistence, and graduation, and reflects the varied quality of private and public 
colleges and universities across the state.  
Subgroup treatment effects 
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Sex. Using this definition of undermatch, male GAMS recipients are .07 probability 
points more likely than female GAMS recipients to undermatch. This is comparable to the 
estimate above using a different undermatch definition; however, this difference is significant 
only at a 90 percent confidence level. 
Race. Nonwhite GAMS recipients are .34 probability points more likely to undermatch 
than GAMS recipients who are white. Again, this is consistent with the findings of prior 
literature exploring the prevalence undermatch among student subgroups. However, while the 
direction is the same, this estimate is more than double the magnitude of the effect of GAMS on 
nonwhite students described above. This further emphasizes that being very clear about the 
definition of undermatch used is critical when drawing conclusions about this phenomenon.  
Pell. Pell eligible GAMS recipients are .36 probability points more likely than non-Pell 
eligible GAMS recipients undermatch using this definition. As above, this is similar to the 
findings of prior research on this topic, and may reflect students’ hesitation to apply to or enroll 
at institutions they perceive to be too expensive. 
Robustness check. Again, to examine the robustness of these findings and to further 
confirm the model specification, I drop observations in the tails of the ACT distribution to 
determine whether estimates of undermatch change substantially. The robustness check for this 
definition of undermatch is presented in Table 4.6. As with the previous definition of 
undermatch, the estimates presented in this table confirm that a quadratic functional form is best 
fitting, and that the results are robust to removing these observations. 
Limitations 
The biggest limitation to this study is that conclusions about students’ probability of 
undermatch are limited to those immediately around the GAMS cutoff – an ACT score of 29. 
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This is a consequence of employing a regression discontinuity design. A strategy to generalize 
conclusions about undermatch to inframarginal students away from the cutoff is proposed by 
Angrist and Rokkanen (2015). This method requires conditioning on covariates other than the 
running variable (i.e., students’ grades, distance to a two- or four-year institution) to reduce or 
eliminate the relationship between the outcome of interest (undermatch) and the running variable 
(ACT score). Doing so (and relying on the conditional independence assumption) helps to 
address omitted variable bias, such that findings are more generalizable to the entire sample 
(Angrist & Rokkanen, 2015).  
Also, the GAMS program serves a relatively small number of students, relative to other 
merit-based financial aid programs in Tennessee. As such, this chapter employs a comparatively 
smaller sample than had recipients of all other types of scholarships been included. Further, this 
chapter does not include an indicator for an offer of a GAMS award, to examine the decisions of 
high achieving students who did not accept the award and instead chose to enroll out-of-state. 
As Tennessee currently provides substantial financial incentives for students to attend 
community and technical colleges, the enrollment decisions of these high-flying high school 
graduates are not a high policy priority. It remains important, however, to explore whether these 
awards are encouraging students to stay in-state and enroll in a well-matched institution.  
Conclusion 
When discussing the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program, students 
who receive these awards are often lumped into one category of “TELS recipients.” Doing so 
masks any variation in the effect of the three distinct award types (each of which has different 
criteria for receipt and a different award amount) on students’ enrollment decisions. The 
objective of this paper is to determine the effect of one scholarship type – the General Assembly 
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Merit Scholarship – on the highest achieving students’ likelihood of undermatch. Though higher 
education policy in Tennessee (and elsewhere) is currently focused on inducing students on the 
margin of college attendance to enroll via a free community college program (which will be 
explored in Chapter 5), it remains important to investigate where the highest achieving high 
school graduates are matriculating throughout the state. Given the economic and social returns to 
attending a selective college or university (as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3) it is critical to 
understand more fully whether a difference of $1,000 ($4,000 for HOPE; $5,000 for GAMS) has 
a substantial effect on these students’ college-going decisions.   
Further, the two definitions of undermatch used in this study yield quite different main 
effects, reinforcing that it is imperative that researchers are clear about the definition of 
undermatch used when drawing conclusions about this issue, and acknowledge that findings 
apply only to those students around the cutoff value. The definition must be appropriate for one’s 
research questions and the characteristics of the sample of interest. For example, when the 
analysis is focused on GAMS recipients, using the definition of undermatch discussed in Chapter 
3 that relies on distance from entering students’ average ACT score would have yielded 
astronomical rates of undermatch, as the mean ACT composite score at all institutions in 
Tennessee except for Vanderbilt University is below 29, the cut off for GAMS receipt. This is 
just one example of why clarity and transparency with regard to how undermatch is 
conceptualized is critical to informed discussion about this topic.    
Finally, when considering the enrollment behavior of certain subgroups of students, it is 
clear that the findings of prior literature are applicable to this study as well: students who are 
nonwhite and low income are much more likely to undermatch than their white, middle income 
peers, no matter how undermatch is defined. This consistent finding should inform the way 
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policymakers, educators and community members think about this issue and structure 




Angrist, J., & Rokkanen, M. (2015). Wanna get away? Regression discontinuity estimation of 
exam school effects away from the cutoff. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 110(512), 1331-1344.  
 
Bowen, W., Chingos, M., & McPherson, M. (2009). Crossing the finish line: Completing college  
at America’s public institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Bruce, D. J.  & Carruthers, C.K. (2014). Jackpot? The impact of lottery scholarships on  
enrollment in Tennessee. Journal of Urban Economics, 81, 30-44.  
 
Cohodes, S. & Goodman, J. (2014). Merit aid, college quality, and college completion:  
Massachusetts’ Adams Scholarship as an in-kind subsidy. American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 6(4), 251-285.  
 
Dillon, E.W. & Smith, J.A. (2017). The determinants of mismatch between  
students and colleges. Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.  
 
Dynarski, S. (2000). HOPE for whom? Financial aid for the middle class and its impact on  
college attendance. National Tax Journal, 53(3), 629-661. 
 
Hahn, J., Todd, P., & van der Klaauw, W. (2001) Identification and estimation of treatment  
effects with a regression discontinuity design. Econometrica, 69, 201-209.  
 
Imbens, G., & Kalyanaraman, K. (2012). Optimal bandwidth choice for the regression  
discontinuity estimator. Review of Economic Studies, 79(3), 933-959.  
 
Imbens, G., & Lemieux, T. (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice.  
Journal of Econometrics, 142, 615-635.  
 
Jacob, R., Zhu, P., Somers, M., & Bloom, H. (2012). A practical guide to regression  
discontinuity. Available: http://www.mdrc.org/publication/practical-guide-regression-
discontinuity.   
 
Lee, D, & Card, D. (2008). Regression discontinuity inference with specification error. Journal  
of Econometrics, 142(2), 655-674.  
 
McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: 
A density test. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 698-714. 
 
Pallais, A. (2009). Taking a chance on college: Is the Tennessee Education Lottery a  






Tennessee Higher Education Commission. (2016). 2016 Tennessee Education Lottery  
Scholarship Annual Report. Available: https://www.tn.gov/thec/article/2016-legislative-
reports.  
 
Zhang, L., Hu, S., Sun, L., & Pu, S. (2016). The effect of Florida’s Bright Futures program on  










HOPE Aspire GAMS 
Annual award amount (full time, 4-year) $4,000  $5,500  $5,000  
Annual award amount (full time, 2-year) $2,000  $2,750  $2,500  
Minimum high school GPA 3 3 3.75 
Minimum ACT composite or 21 or 21 and 29 





Table 4.2. Sample descriptive statistics, by TELS award type 
 
 
  Full sample HOPE GAMS 
% Female 50.3 51.5 43.4 
Race 
   
% White 84.9 84.4 88.3 
% Black 5.6 6.3 1.5 
% Hispanic 2.2 2.3 1.9 
% Pell eligible 29.9 30.5 22.2 
Median ACT 24 23 30 
Median high school 
GPA 
3.60 3.54 3.96 
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Table 4.3. OLS and Parametric effects of GAMS receipt on likelihood of undermatch: 
Attending Top 4 Institutions in Tennessee 
 
  Linear,       
  No covariates Linear Quadratic Cubic 
GAMS 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.11** 0.12** 
 
(0.037) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) 
ACT 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 
(0.04) (0.004) (0.02) (0.063) 
ACT*GAMS 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 
 































0.08* 0.05* 0.05* 
  
(0.048) (0.045) (0.045) 
Pell 
 
0.27** 0.20** 0.20** 
  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) 
Nonwhite 
 
0.29** 0.25** 0.25** 
  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 
 
0.57 0.52 0.5 
AIC 83101 83055 83017 83010 
F test (p-value) 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.27 
N students 63,288 63,288 63,288 63,288 
*p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 
 
   Standard errors in parentheses 
    Linear model is referent 
 




Table 4.4. OLS and Parametric effects of GAMS receipt on likelihood of undermatch:  





Linear Quadratic Cubic 
GAMS 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 
 
(0.24) (0.044) (0.011) (0.096) 
ACT 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 
 
(0.017) (0.005) (0.024) (0.076) 
ACT*GAMS 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.18* 
 































0.05** 0.07** 0.07** 
  
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
Nonwhite 
 
0.29** 0.34** 0.35** 
  
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Pell 
 
0.28** 0.36** 0.37** 
  
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 
 
0.226 0.249 0.337 
AIC 57556 57506 57026 57397 
F test (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.33 
N students 63,288 63,288 63,288 63,288 
*p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 
 
   Standard errors in parentheses 
    Linear model is referent 
 




Table 4.5. Nonparametric effects of GAMS receipt on likelihood of undermatch,  
by definition of undermatch 
  
 






2 0.10 0.009 
4 0.11 0.035 
6 0.19 0.023 






2 0.20 0.009 
4 0.23 0.042 





Table 4.6. Robustness checks to confirm quadratic model specification  
 
  Top 4 Institutions Dillon and Smith (2017) 
 
Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error 
All ACT scores 
    Main effect 0.110** 0.013 0.230*** 0.011 
Sex 0.050* 0.045 0.070*** 0.003 
Race (nonwhite) 0.200** 0.005 0.340*** 0.003 
Pell eligible 0.250** 0.004 0.360*** 0.003 
ACT 23-34 
    Main effect 0.105** 0.015 0.220*** 0.013 
Sex 0.053** 0.045 0.070** 0.003 
Race (nonwhite) 0.224** 0.007 0.340*** 0.005 
Pell eligible 0.272** 0.005 0.357*** 0.004 
ACT 25-32 
    Main effect 0.099** 0.023 0.205** 0.018 
Sex 0.052** 0.047 0.068** 0.004 
Race (nonwhite) 0.209*** 0.009 0.325** 0.007 
Pell eligible 0.267*** 0.006 0.348** 0.005 
ACT 27-30 
    Main effect 0.098** 0.019 0.204*** 0.016 
Sex 0.052** 0.049 0.060** 0.007 
Race (nonwhite) 0.202*** 0.014 0.301*** 0.011 
Pell eligible 0.255*** 0.009 0.320*** 0.009 
 
*p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 










Tennessee Achieves, an initiative providing last-dollar tuition and fees at community and 
technical colleges in Tennessee, has seen great success enrolling recent high school graduates in 
less-than-four year institutions. What is less clear is whether this program leads to undermatch 
among students who could have attended more selective four-year colleges or universities. Using 
data provided by the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, I use difference-in-differences 
and propensity score matching methodologies to explore the effect of this program on 
undermatch. I conclude that students with access to Tennessee Achieves in three of the largest 
treated counties are more likely to undermatch than their peers in counties without access to this 
program, irrespective of the definition of undermatch. Students’ probabilities of undermatch vary 





Tuition-free college initiatives are becoming increasingly popular policy proposals at the 
state and national levels (i.e., American Association of Community Colleges, 2016; Weeden & 
Hultin, 2015). As interest in these programs grows, it is important to note that a handful of 
communities (i.e., Kalamazoo, Michigan and Knox County, Tennessee) have had such programs 
in place for close to a decade. As such, much of what is known about the effect of tuition-free 
college plans on enrollment, persistence, and completion is due to investigations of the 
Kalamazoo Promise and Knox Achieves, two of the most well-established free college initiatives 
(i.e., Andrews, DesJardins, & Ranchhod, 2010; Bartik, Hershbein, & Lachowska, 2015; 
Carruthers & Fox, 2016). What is less clear is the effect of free college initiatives on student 
match: is “free college” incentivizing students to enroll at less selective institutions than the best 
among those they are academically eligible to attend?  
Tennessee has been at the forefront of the statewide tuition-free college movement, as 
Governor Bill Haslam introduced the statewide Tennessee Promise program in early 2014. 
Beginning in Fall 2015, the Tennessee Promise offers tuition-free community and technical 
college to all recent high school graduates in Tennessee. The implementation of the Tennessee 
Promise is a classic example of policy diffusion (i.e., Berry & Berry, 1999): this free college 
initiative grew from one county (Knox Achieves) to 27 counties (renamed Tennessee Achieves) 
and is now available to students in all of Tennessee’s 95 counties (renamed Tennessee Promise).  
Because of the rapidity of this expansion, there remains much to learn about the effects of 
free community and technical college on young Tennesseans’ postsecondary enrollment 
decisions. The objective of this chapter is to determine whether Tennessee Achieves led to 
increases in undermatch in the three largest of the 27 treated counties between 2009 and 2014. 
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Because Tennessee Achieves provided a financial incentive for students to attend community 
and technical colleges rather than four-year institutions, exposure to this program may have 
caused high achieving students to downshift to two-year institutions. This chapter builds upon 
the work of Carruthers and Fox (2016) who investigated the influence of Knox Achieves, the 
free community and technical college program available only to students in Knox County, 
Tennessee, on students’ high school graduation outcomes and postsecondary enrollment. 
Carruthers and Fox (2016) 
Carruthers and Fox (2016) employ difference-in-differences and propensity score 
matching to determine the effect of Knox Achieves on students’ likelihood of high school 
graduation and college-going decisions. They determine that students exposed to Knox Achieves 
(i.e., enrolled in high school in Knox County, where the program was available) were more 
likely to graduate from high school and enroll seamlessly in higher education, relative to 
neighboring counties without the program. Students who participated in (i.e., enrolled in a 
community or technical college as a Knox Achieves student) Knox Achieves were more likely 
than their non-treated peers in neighboring counties to enroll seamlessly into higher education 
following high school graduation, and were slightly less likely to enroll at four-year institutions 
(Carruthers & Fox, 2016). Increases in postsecondary enrollment were most statistically 
significant among low-income (Pell eligible) students (Carruthers & Fox, 2016).  
Contribution and research questions 
 I contribute to the limited body of literature exploring free college programs by 
investigating the effect of Tennessee Achieves on undermatch: does this program lead high 
achieving students to attend less selective, lower quality postsecondary institutions? A greater 
understanding of how these programs affect students’ college-going decisions is critical, as free 
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college programs are being proposed and piloted across the United States. I will explore whether 
undermatch varies by the definition of undermatch employed and by location, as the three treated 
counties are located in the East, Middle, and West regions of Tennessee. 
Further, I will extend the work of Carruthers and Fox (2016) by including three more 
recent cohorts of high school graduates (the graduating classes of 2012-2014) and by expanding 
the analysis to focus on the three largest of the 27 Tennessee Achieves counties: Davidson, 
Knox, and Shelby counties. These counties are the center of the three largest metropolitan 
statistical areas in Tennessee (Nashville, Knoxville, and Memphis, respectively), which comprise 
approximately one-third of high school age (age 15-19) students in Tennessee, and served the 
largest number of Tennessee Achieves students from 2009 through 2014 (American Community 
Survey, 2014; Tennessee Achieves, 2016).  
Finally, I will contribute to ongoing policy discussions in Tennessee and nationwide 
about the benefits and consequences – intended and unintended – of free college programs. 
While much of the evidence informing the development of these programs is descriptive at best, 
a more rigorous study will give more depth to the claims made by proponents and detractors of 
such programs.  
I explore the following research questions: 
1. Are students with access to Tennessee Achieves in Davidson, Knox, and Shelby counties 
more likely to undermatch than their peers in neighboring, untreated counties? 
2. Does the effect of Tennessee Achieves on students’ probability of undermatch vary based 
on the definition of undermatch employed? 
3. Does the effect of Tennessee Achieves on students’ probability of undermatch vary by 
treated county, as the counties are located in distinct regions of the state? 
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I hypothesize that those students with access to and who take up Tennessee Achieves are 
more likely to undermatch than their untreated peers, provided that the definition of undermatch 
is that they attend a two-year rather a four-year institution. If the definition of undermatch is one 
that more robustly accounts for institutional quality (i.e., Dillon and Smith, 2017), I hypothesize 
that Tennessee Achieves students are no more likely to undermatch than their untreated peers. 
This is because many will attend community and technical colleges that are comparable on many 
dimensions to some lower quality four-year institutions. Finally, I hypothesize that the 
probability of undermatch among treated students in Davidson and Shelby counties (Nashville 
and Memphis metropolitan areas, respectively) will be comparable, while students in Knox 
County (Knoxville) will have an increased probability of undermatch. This is due to the quality 
(i.e., available resources, graduation rates) of community and technical colleges in this region, as 
well as the maturity of the program in Knox County (THEC, 2016). 
Program description: Tennessee Achieves 
Beginning in Fall 2010,
21
 Tennessee Achieves provided donor-funded last dollar 
scholarships to recent high school graduates. There were no academic or financial criteria for 
receipt of this aid, only a geographic constraint: students must graduate from a public or private 
high school in a treated county to be eligible. There is no evidence that students and their 
families relocated or enrolled in high schools across a county border to gain access to this 
program (Tennessee Achieves, 2016). A Tennessee Achieves scholarship could be applied to 
tuition and mandatory fees at any of the 13 community or 27 technical colleges in the state, 
though over 85 percent of students attended a campus in their home county (THEC, 2016). On 
average, these last-dollar awards were approximately $900 annually. Award amounts varied very 
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 Students living in Knox County were exposed to Knox Achieves beginning in 2009. 
Expansion to additional counties began in 2010, when the program was rebranded as Tennessee 
Achieves. Knox County is included in this study’s sample. 
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little by the institution at which the awards were applied to tuition and fees (Carruthers & Fox, 
2016; THEC, 2016). 
To receive this aid, high school seniors were required to apply for the program via an 
online application, file the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), meet twice with a 
volunteer mentor (assigned by Tennessee Achieves) and complete eight hours of community 
service. If a student did not complete any of these steps, or did not do so by the program-imposed 
deadlines, he was no longer eligible for this scholarship. Students were required to enroll in a 
community or technical college seamlessly following high school graduation and to enroll full 
time. To retain the award once enrolled, students must earn a grade point average of 2.0 or 
higher, remain enrolled full time, and complete eight hours of community service each term, 
including summer.
22
    
Prior to the statewide expansion of this program, Tennessee Achieves served over 10,000 
students with a privately funded annual budget (including scholarship awards) of approximately 
$3 million (Tennessee Achieves, 2016). Approximately 65 percent of Tennessee Achieves 
students were first-generation college-goers, and 70 percent were Pell eligible, reflecting the 
program’s initial goal of enrolling students who are traditionally underrepresented in higher 
education in Tennessee and nationwide (THEC, 2016; Tennessee Achieves, 2016).  
Data 
Student-level administrative data for eight cohorts of high school graduates (graduating 
high school classes of 2007-2014; pre- and post-Tennessee Achieves implementation) is 
provided by the Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC), Tennessee’s public higher 
education coordinating board. Variables provided by THEC include student demographic (e.g., 
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 The criteria for receipt and retention of Tennessee Achieves scholarships are identical to those 
of the statewide Tennessee Promise program.  
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sex, race), socioeconomic (e.g., Pell grant eligibility), and academic (e.g., ACT composite score) 
characteristics, county of residence, and the first institution at which a student enrolls following 
high school graduation. This dataset also includes dichotomous variables (0/1) to indicate 
whether a student participated in Tennessee Achieves, whether he graduated from a high school 
in a county in which Tennessee Achieves was available, and whether he graduated from high 
school before or after the program’s implementation in his home county. County-level controls 
variables (e.g., unemployment rate at the time of Tennessee Achieves implementation, 
educational attainment, number of less-than-four-year institutions) in treated and control counties 
are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the American Community Survey, and THEC, 
respectively. 
Sample 
 The sample for this analysis is comprised of high school graduates from the three largest 
counties with access to Tennessee Achieves (Davidson, Knox, and Shelby) and their neighboring 
counties in which the program was not available. Figure 5.1 presents a map of the three treated 
counties (shaded in dark gray) and the fifteen control counties (shaded in light gray) that 
surround them. Table 5.1 provides this information in tabular form and includes the year of 
program implementation and years of data included in the sample.
23
  
Table 5.2 presents sample descriptive statistics for students in treated and untreated 
counties. The sample is limited to traditional-aged students who enroll in higher education 
immediately following high school; approximately 70 percent of postsecondary enrollees in 
Tennessee (THEC, 2016). There is substantial variation in Tennessee Achieves student 
                                                             
23 Tennessee Achieves was implemented in the counties serving as controls for Knox County in 
2012. For this reason, only three years of Tennessee Achieves data for Knox County are 
included, though the program was in place for six years prior to the statewide expansion. 
Tennessee Achieves expanded into Blount County in 2010; as such, it is excluded as a control 
county.    
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characteristics, which reflects the distinct demographic and socioeconomic traits of Tennessee’s 
three regions. These differences are evident in the control counties as well. The majority of 
Tennessee Achieves students in Davidson County are female; in Knox and Shelby counties, 
approximately half of the treated students are female. In Shelby County, which is predominately 
African American, almost two-thirds of Tennessee Achieves students are black, compared to 
only 15.6 percent in Knox County, which is a disproportionately white county. A much larger 
proportion of Tennessee Achieves students in Davidson and Shelby counties are low income 
(Pell eligible) as compared to their treated peers in Knox County. Average ACT Composite 
scores are similar across treated and control counties. Given the large differences in student 
characteristics in each Tennessee Achieves county, it is important to emphasize that each of the 
three counties are investigated separately and are compared only to their untreated neighbors. 
This strategy will be discussed at length in the Methodology section below.  
County-level characteristics are used as controls in the difference-in-differences model, 
and are presented in Table 5.3. County unemployment rates are as of the September prior to the 
implementation of Tennessee Achieves (2008, 2010, and 2013 for Knox, Shelby, and Davidson 
counties and their control counties, respectively) as this is when high school seniors begin the 
college application process. In treated counties, unemployment was lower than in many of the 
control counties, ranging from 3.9 to 5.9 percent; in counties without access to Tennessee 
Achieves, the unemployment rate ranged from 3.4 to 8.0 percent. With the exception of 
Williamson County, which is the most affluent and highly educated county in the state, 
educational attainment (defined as the proportion of adults with an Associate’s degree or higher) 
ranges from approximately 25 to 45 percent, with treated counties on the high end of this range. 
Each Tennessee Achieves county has two two-year institutions (a community college and a 
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technical college) in the county; five control counties have one or two two-year institutions 
within county lines.  
Methodology 
Difference-in-differences 
To determine the effect of the availability of Tennessee Achieves on students’ 
probabilities of undermatch, I first estimate a county-level difference-in-differences (DID) 
regression. As Tennessee Achieves was implemented at the county level, this method will 
compare the probability of undermatch in the three largest counties with access to Tennessee 
Achieves (“treated counties”) to that of their adjacent neighboring counties without exposure to 
the program (“control counties”). Only those counties that border the treated county are included 
as controls. This is done to reflect region-specific differences throughout the state, including 
local higher education opportunities, local labor markets and workforce and industry needs, and 
the quality of local K-12 education systems. 
An important consideration when conducting a difference-in-differences regression is the 
parallel trends assumption: in the absence of intervention (i.e., Tennessee Achieves) the average 
change in the outcome (i.e., rate of undermatch) in treated and untreated counties would have 
been the same. While this assumption is untestable, it is important to state that trends in higher 
education enrollment in Tennessee in the years immediately preceding Tennessee Achieves 
implementation are consistent across all of Tennessee’s 95 counties. For example, the county-
level college-going rates are consistent, and enrollment at all 13 community colleges across the 
state decreased as the economy in Tennessee improved. Further, there were no substantial 
changes to state-funded financial aid during this time (THEC, 2016.) 
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 The data used to estimate the DID regression include high school graduates before and 
after the implementation of Tennessee Achieves (the graduating classes of 2007-2014) for three 
treated counties and their untreated neighbors. Equation (1) presents the DID linear probability 
model: 
𝑌𝑐𝑡 =  𝐵0 + 𝐵1(𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑐) + 𝐵2(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑐) +  𝐵3(𝑋𝑐𝑡) +  𝐵4(𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑐 ∗ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑐) + 𝐵5(𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑐 ∗
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑐 ∗ 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖) +  𝐵6(𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑐 ∗ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖) + 𝐵7(𝑍𝑖) +  𝑒𝑐𝑡 (1) 
where Yct  is an indicator of undermatch in county c in year t, TNAc is a dichotomous variable 
(0/1) reflecting the presence of Tennessee Achieves in county c, PREc is a dichotomous variable 
(0/1) representing pre-or post-Tennessee Achieves implementation in county c,  Xct is a vector of 
county-level characteristics in year t (e.g., unemployment, educational attainment, the number of 
less-than-four-year institutions in the county), and TNAc*YEARc is the interaction of the presence 
of Tennessee Achieves and the year pre- and post-treatment. B4, the coefficient on this 
interaction term, is the initial parameter of interest, as it is the main effect of the availability of 
Tennessee Achieves on undermatch. (TNAc*YEARc* NONi) and (TNAc*YEARc* Pelli) are 
additional interaction terms to determine the effect of the availability of Tennessee Achieves on 
undermatch among nonwhite and lower income (Pell eligible) students, respectively. B5 and B6 
are these subgroup estimates. Zi is a vector of student characteristics, including sex, race, ACT 
score, Pell eligibility, and a dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating whether a community college 
is located within 10 miles of the student’s high school. These covariates are included as they 
have been found in prior literature to relate to students’ probabilities of undermatch. Finally, ect 
is the error term.  
Propensity score matching  
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Propensity score matching is used to explore the effect of Tennessee Achieves on the 
probability of undermatch among treated students. Each Tennessee Achieves student is matched 
with an untreated student in a neighboring control county who has the same propensity to 
participate in Tennessee Achieves had it been available.
24
 Students in treated counties are 
matched with those in untreated counties to account somewhat for self-selection into the 
program. Students with access to Tennessee Achieves who take up the program may differ on a 
number of unobserved characteristics (i.e., motivation, organization) from those who have access 
but do not participate. As such, students are not matched within-county in an attempt to mitigate 
this issue.  
Propensity scores are calculated using observed characteristics including year of high 
school graduation, county of residence, sex, race, Pell-eligibility and ACT scores within the 
sample of treated students. Students in untreated counties are then matched with those in treated 
counties, based on their propensities to participate in Tennessee Achieves. The set of covariates 
used to calculate the propensity scores meets the conditional independence assumption necessary 
when conducting propensity score analyses. 
The conditional independence assumption (CIA) states that when holding constant 
covariates such as those listed above, assignment to treatment (Tennessee Achieves) is 
independent of the outcome of interest (undermatch). Further, each of these covariates is 
unaffected by the treatment
25
 and are measured prior to treatment. These covariates, particularly 
county of residence and year of high school graduation, fully determine access to the program; 
                                                             
24 Treated students in the three treated counties are matched only with untreated students who 
live in a county neighboring their own. For example, a treated student in Shelby County is 
matched only with an untreated student in Tipton or Fayette counties, both of which neighbor 
Shelby County.  
25
 All covariates that do influence assignment to treatment – county of residence, year of high 




the only variability in participation is whether a student decides to take up the program or not, 
which provides the rationale for not matching within-county (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Guo 
& Fraser, 2010).    
I use nearest neighbor matching with replacement to match treated students with those in 
neighboring counties without access to Tennessee Achieves, following the methodology 
employed by Carruthers and Fox (2016) in their investigation of Knox Achieves.
26
 Untreated 
students are matched within a 0.05 percentage point window of the treated student’s 
propensity.
27
 Nearest neighbor matching is most appropriate for this analysis as it is the most 
straightforward method of propensity score matching (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) and, as 
mentioned above, best accounts for self-selection into Tennessee Achieves, which is perhaps the 
largest source of omitted variable bias in this analysis (Carruthers & Fox, 2016).  
The linear probability model used to calculate the propensity score is:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0  +  𝐵1(𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖) + 𝐵2(𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑌𝑖) +  𝐵3(𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡      (2) 
where Yit is a binary indicator for a student’s participation in Tennessee Achieves in year t, 
YEARi is the student’s year of high school graduation, COUNTYi is the student’s county of 
residence, Xit is a vector of student characteristics on which he is matched (e.g., sex, race, Pell 
eligibility, ACT score, high school’s distance from a community college), and eit is the error 
term. The result of this model provides the propensity score for all - treated and untreated - 
students in the sample. Treated and control students are balanced (distribution does not vary by 
treatment status) on the aforementioned demographic and academic covariates (p > .05; variance 
ratios data range from 0.88 for Pell eligibility to 1.32 for ACT scores).  
                                                             
26
 Students are matched using the teffects command in Stata, as teffects calculates adjusted, 
robust standard errors when conducting propensity score analyses. 
27
 Matching students without replacement, using a narrower caliper (0.02 and 0.01) and using 
kernel matching yield similar results for the full sample and for student subgroups. 
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 After matching Tennessee Achieves students to their non-treated peers with the same 
propensity to participate in Tennessee Achieves, I calculate the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATET) of participating in Tennessee Achieves on students’ probability of undermatch. 
The ATET is the difference in the probability of undermatch between matched pairs. These 
treatment effects are discussed in the Results section below.  
Definitions of undermatch 
This paper employs two of the five definitions of undermatch discussed in Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation. The first definition of undermatch is perhaps the most intuitive: Tennessee 
Achieves students who are academically eligible to attend a four-year institution in Tennessee 
(having earned an ACT composite score of 18 or higher) but instead attend a community or 
technical college are labeled as undermatched. As attending a two- versus four-year institution is 
the margin on which many students undermatch (i.e., Goodman, Hurwitz, & Smith, 2016), this is 
relevant not only to the structure of the Tennessee Achieves (now Tennessee Promise) program, 
which drives the cost of tuition and fees at a community or technical college to zero, but to 
broader discussions about free college programs and student match. 
The second definition of undermatch is used by Dillon and Smith (2017) to account more 
fully for institutional quality, rather than simply considering students’ academic abilities to 
determine appropriate match. As community and technical colleges in Tennessee enroll a 
freshmen class that is similar in composition to some less selective four-year institutions and 
have similar per-pupil resources (see Chapter 1), using this definition will determine whether 
Tennessee Achieves students attend a community or technical college that is of lower quality 





Results of the difference-in-differences regression are presented in Table 5.4. These 
estimates of undermatch are, by definition, lower than those produced using propensity score 
matching (presented below). This is because the difference-in-differences estimates are based on 
the availability of Tennessee Achieves (intent to treat), not take up of Tennessee Achieves 
(treatment on the treated).  
Using the first definition of undermatch (attending a two-year institution when 
academically eligible to attend a four-year), students with access to Tennessee Achieves by 
virtue of graduating from a high school in Davidson, Knox, or Shelby counties in the years in 
which the program was available are 0.061 probability points
28
 more likely than their peers in 
neighboring counties to undermatch. This is logical, as the structure of Tennessee Achieves 
incentivizes students to enroll in a community or technical college. This estimate is significant at 
the 0.01 level, demonstrating that access to a free college program has a statistically significant 
effect on students’ decisions to enroll in two-year institutions when they are academically 
eligible to attend a four-year institution. This finding is relevant to ongoing policy discussions 
about the expansion of such programs in other states, as merely having access to a tuition-free 
community or technical college program leads to a statistically significant change in students 
enrollment decisions. 
The second definition of undermatch, which more thoroughly accounts for institutional 
quality, yields an estimate of 0.019 probability points: treated students are 1.9 percentage points 
more likely than their peers in counties without access to Tennessee Achieves to undermatch. 
While the magnitude of this estimate is smaller than that discussed above, it is also statistically 
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significant at the 0.01 level. As such, undermatch behavior between treated and untreated 
students can be said to differ significantly when considering the quality of the institutions in 
which they enroll.  
Subgroup treatment effects 
Sex. When undermatch is defined as attending a two-year institution when a student is 
academically eligible to attend a four-year college or university, male students with access to 
Tennessee Achieves are 8.9 percentage points more likely than their female peers to undermatch. 
Similarly, when using Dillon and Smith’s definition of undermatch to more fully account for 
institutional quality, male students in Davidson, Knox, and Shelby counties are 9.0 percentage 
points more likely than their female peers to undermatch. Both of these estimates are statistically 
significant, and are in line with prior findings about the differences in undermatch between male 
and female students.  
Race. Nonwhite students with access to Tennessee Achieves are 0.078 probability points 
more likely than their white peers to undermatch by attending a two-year institution. This result 
is consistent with findings of prior literature. Using Dillon and Smith’s definition, nonwhite 
students with access to Tennessee Achieves are 0.019 percentage points more likely than their 
white peers to undermatch. These estimates are statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 
levels, respectively. 
Pell. Similar to the findings relative to race, Pell eligible students in Tennessee Achieves 
counties are .091 probability points more likely than their middle/upper income peers to 
undermatch, when undermatch is defined as substituting a two-year for a four-year institution. 
This may be due to the financial incentive to attend a two-year institution, as Tennessee 
Achieves drives the cost of tuition and fees to zero, or the desire to attend a local institution close 
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to home. Pell-eligible students with access to Tennessee Achieves are 11.1 percentage points 
more likely to undermatch than their non-Pell eligible peers when more fully accounting for 
institutional quality, per the Dillon and Smith definition.  
Propensity Score Matching 
Table 5.5 presents the average treatment effects on the treated (ATET) of Tennessee 
Achieves on students’ probability of undermatch. As discussed above, students in treated 
counties were matched only to students in untreated counties that neighbor their county of 
residence. 
Treated students’ probability of undermatch varies by county of residence and the 
definition of undermatch applied. Using the first definition of undermatch, Tennessee Achieves 
students in each of the three treated counties are between .148 and .298 probability points more 
likely than their untreated peers to undermatch by attending a two-year institution when they are 
academically eligible to attend a four-year college or university. That the three counties have 
such dissimilar estimates is not surprising. The concept of tuition-free community college is 
much more well-established in Knox County (predicted probability = .298) as compared to the 
other two counties, and Pellissippi State Community College, located in Knox County, is 
arguably the best community college in the state (i.e., highest average ACT score of entering 
class, highest graduation rate, and highest rate of transfer to a four-year institution) (THEC, 
2016). For these reasons, it makes sense that the effect of Tennessee Achieves on the rate of 
undermatch in Knox County is higher than the other two treated counties.  
Using Dillon and Smith’s (2017) definition of undermatch, Tennessee Achieves students 
in the three treated counties are between .112 (Davidson) and .171 (Shelby) probability points 
more likely than their untreated peers to undermatch. These differences in students’ probability 
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of undermatch may be reflective of the variation in institutional quality that exists across the 
state. Institutions in middle and east Tennessee (i.e., Davidson and Knox counties) are, on the 
whole, of higher quality than institutions in west Tennessee, where Shelby County is located 
(THEC, 2016). As such, students who take up Tennessee Achieves in Davidson and Knox 
counties are not trading off as much quality as their peers in Shelby County when attending a 
community or technical college. Assuming that the average student wants to attend a 
postsecondary institution that is less than three hours (the time it takes to travel from Memphis to 
Nashville, and from Nashville to Knoxville) from home, a student’s choice set in Davidson and 
Knox counties include institutions – both less-than-four and four-year institutions - with higher 
average ACT scores, additional financial and student support resources, lower student-faculty 
ratios, and higher graduation rates than those in Shelby County (THEC, 2016). A Rosenbaum 
bounds test confirms that there is no hidden bias in these estimates due to unobserved 
confounders (gamma = 1, 2, 3; p < .05).  
Subgroup treatment effects 
Sex. If undermatch is defined as attending a two-year institution rather than a four-year 
college or university, male Tennessee Achieves students between 0.8 and 1.7 percentage points 
more likely than their untreated male peers to undermatch. Similarly, when using Dillon and 
Smith’s definition of undermatch, male students are between 0.6 and 0.8 percentage points more 
likely than their untreated male peers to undermatch. These estimates are quite small in 
magnitude, and are not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Race. Nonwhite Tennessee Achieves students are more likely to undermatch than their 
untreated nonwhite peers in all three Tennessee Achieves counties, using both definitions of 
undermatch. Average treatment effects on treated students range from 3.7 percentage points in 
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Shelby County, where college goers are predominately African American, and 2.1 percentage 
points in Davidson County, where there is much greater racial diversity. The aforementioned 
estimates, however, were calculated using Dillon and Smith’s definition of undermatch and the 
two- versus four-year definition, respectively, again emphasizing how different estimates may be 
when applying unique definitions of undermatch. These estimates are statistically significant at 
the .01 level.  
Pell. When undermatch is defined as attending a two-year in place of a four-year 
institution, Tennessee Achieves students who are Pell-eligible are between 2.4 and 3.3 
percentage points more likely than their untreated Pell-eligible peers to undermatch. When using 
Dillon and Smith’s definition of undermatch, Pell-eligible students who participate in Tennessee 
Achieves are between 2.4 to 3.1 percentage points more likely than their untreated Pell-eligible 
peers to undermatch. The likelihood of undermatch among these lower income students is 
highest in Davidson County, which is the most income-diverse of the three treated counties.  
Distance to community college. Tennessee Achieves participants who graduated from a 
high school within 10 miles of a community college are more likely to undermatch than their 
untreated peers who live close to a community college. This is true in all three treated counties 
and when using either definition of undermatch. When undermatch is defined as attended a two-
year rather than a four-year institution, Tennessee Achieves students living near community 
colleges are between .067 and .081 probability points more likely than their peers to undermatch, 
depending on their county of residence. Similarly, using Dillon and Smith’s definition, 
Tennessee Achieves students living within 10 miles of a community college are between .049 
and .076 probability points more likely than their untreated peers to undermatch.  Each of these 
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estimates is statistically significant, and are in line with findings of prior literature exploring the 
effects of proximity to different institution types on students’ enrollment decisions. 
Directions for future research 
 An issue inherent to discussions of free community college programs is the quality of 
community colleges at which students may attend tuition-free. As seen above, access to a high 
quality community college (i.e., Pellissippi State Community College in Knox County) has a 
substantial influence on students’ enrollment decisions, especially when the tuition cost of 
enrolling at the local community college in driven to zero. As tuition-free community college 
initiatives continue to be popular policy proposals throughout the country, much still needs to be 
done to improve community colleges’ processes (i.e., academic and student support services) and 
student outcomes (i.e., transfer and graduation rates) to address the “community college penalty” 
(i.e., Reynolds, 2012) if students are being incentivized to attend a two-year rather than a four-
year institution. Additionally, as such programs may alter the composition of students enrolling 
at two- or four-year institutions, measures of quality and selectivity that rely on students’ 
academic characteristics (i.e., high school GPA, ACT scores) have the potential to shift 
substantially. 
Further, the structure of free college programs will have differential effects on student 
match. As Tennessee Achieves (now Tennessee Promise) provides a financial incentive for 
students to enroll at two-year institutions, their likelihood of undermatch by substituting two-
year for four-year institutions is increased. However, the Kalamazoo Promise, for example, 
provides tuition and fees at any public institution in Michigan, including the state’s most 
selective public universities: the University of Michigan and Michigan State University. As such, 
student match may be improved, as students with access to the Kalamazoo Promise will apply to 
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and attend more selective institutions with greater frequency (Andrews, et al., 2010; Bartik, et 
al., 2015). As the number of free college proposals grows, and input is solicited from researchers 
and policymakers, it is imperative the effects of different free college program structures on 
student match are investigated thoroughly.  
Limitations 
A limitation to this chapter is that it examines the effect on Tennessee Achieves on 
students’ probability of undermatch in only three of the 27 participating counties. While this is 
useful to policy discussions and captures that majority of students participating in Tennessee 
Achieves, a future paper exploring undermatch in all 27 counties will shed light on additional 
variation (i.e., quality of K-12 school system, urban versus rural counties, etc.) that exists in 
students’ college-going decisions across the state. The challenge in doing so, however, will be 
determining the most appropriate control counties, as counties contiguous to treated counties will 
often themselves be treated. 
Another limitation to this chapter is the different lengths of time for which each of these 
counties participated in Tennessee Achieves. More mature counties, by virtue of being more 
mature, had more observations in the dataset, potentially increasing the statistical power of 
estimates of the effect of this program on undermatch. To mitigate this, future research can 
perhaps begin at a certain point in time and move forward; when exploring Tennessee Promise, 
future research can simply control for a county’s participation in Tennessee Achieves prior to the 
statewide expansion of this initiative.  
Conclusion 
As tuition-free college initiatives remain popular policy proposals, there is much to learn 
about the effects of such programs on students’ college-going decisions (i.e., how search and 
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choice change), and eventually, their persistence and degree attainment. This paper explores the 
effect of one such program – Tennessee Achieves – on students’ enrollment choices. 
Specifically, I investigate whether access to and take up of this program leads to increases in 
students’ probability of undermatch. 
The findings support the aforementioned hypotheses. When undermatch is defined as a 
student attending a two-year institution when he is academically eligible to attend a four-year, 
both intent-to-treat (ITT) and average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) demonstrate that 
Tennessee Achieves students are more likely than their peers to undermatch. Exposure to 
Tennessee Achieves resulted in an increase of 6.1 percentage points in the likelihood of students 
who are eligible to attend four year institutions enrolling at two-year institutions. This ITT 
estimate is important for policymakers to consider when proposing free college policies, as this 
is the estimated effect of the program on undermatch, irrespective of actual program take up. The 
probability of undermatch among treated students in the three treated counties ranges 
approximately 14.8 to 29.8 percentage points, with rates varying slightly between the three 
counties. Lower income and nonwhite students have increased probabilities of undermatch, 
relative to their untreated peers. 
When the definition of undermatch more fully captures institutional quality, not only 
students’ academic abilities, students who take up Tennessee Achieves are between 11.2 and 
17.1 percentage points more likely to undermatch than their untreated peers. This is counter to 
the hypothesis above, and is likely due to the substantial differences in student body composition 
and resources available at two- versus four-year institutions in Tennessee.  
This variation in rates of undermatch emphasizes the point made in Chapter 3: the 
definition of undermatch matters to conclusions drawn about this phenomenon, and different 
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definitions will yield different results. It is important, therefore, that researchers and 
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Table 5.1. Tennessee Achieves implementation and neighboring (untreated) counties 
 
 
TNA county Implementation year N years in sample Control counties 




Knox 2009 3* 
Anderson, Grainger, Jefferson, 
Loudon, Roane, Sevier, Union 
Shelby 2011 4 Fayette, Tipton 
 
Note: Tennessee Achieves was introduced in Anderson, Grainger, Jefferson, Loudon, Roane, Sevier 
and Union counties in 2012. As such, these are appropriate control counties for only three cohorts of 








Davidson County Knox County Shelby County 
  All TNA Controls All TNA Controls All TNA Controls 








% nonwhite (black & 
































TNA Implementation Year 
 
2014   
 
2009   
 








N students 4,004 417 3,587 4,316 1,244 3,072 3,547 1,976 1,571 
Note: Tennessee Achieves students are program participants. 
Sample limited to students enrolling immediately following high school.
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Table 5.3. County-level unemployment, attainment, and presence of two-year institutions   
 
County Implementation year % unemployed * 
% adults with 




Davidson 2014 5.9 42.5 2 
Cheatham 
 
6.4 26.0 0 
Robertson 
 
6.5 24.0 0 
Rutherford 
 
6.0 36.6 1 
Sumner 
 
6.1 31.3 1 
Williamson 
 
5.2 60.0 0 
Wilson 
 
6.2 34.8 0 
Knox 2009 5.3 43.1 2 
Anderson 
 
6.2 29.6 0 
Grainger 
 
8.0 17.9 1 
Jefferson 
 
6.7 21.7 0 
Loudon 
 
5.8 32.8 0 
Roane 
 
6.0 25.1 2 
Sevier 
 
5.8 22.4 0 
Union 
 
6.2 13.9 0 
Shelby 2011 3.9 36.0 2 
Fayette 
 
6.2 28.4 0 
Tipton   3.4 22.6 1 






Table 5.4. Difference-in-differences: Effect of Tennessee Achieves on undermatch 
 
  1 2 
Definition of undermatch 2 vs. 4 year Dillon & Smith 
   Post-treatment -0.01 0.014*** 
 
(0.022) (0.024) 
Treated county 0.125*** 0.253*** 
 
(0.035) (0.041) 
Post * Treated 0.061*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.028) (0.032) 
Education attainment -0.070*** -0.020*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment rate 0.044*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
N 2-year institutions 0.032*** 0.080*** 
 
(0.015) (0.017) 
< 10 miles to CC 0.057*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Female * Post * Treated -0.089*** -0.09** 
 
(0.018) (0.021) 
Nonwhite * Post * Treated 0.078*** 0.019** 
 
(0.018) (0.021) 
Pell * Post * Treated 0.091*** 0.111** 
 
(0.016) (0.026) 
Observations 110,147 110,147 
R2 0.032 0.009 
Chi2 4388.4 1198.2 
Note: Sample limited to students enrolling immediately following high 
school. 
Clustered (county by year) standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < .01 





Table 5.5. Propensity score matching results: Tennessee Achieves participation and 
probability of undermatch 
 
 
Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated (ATET) 
Definition  Davidson Knox Shelby 
2- versus 4-year institution 0.177*** 0.298*** 0.148*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Female -0.017 -0.012 -0.009 
 
(0.027) (0.014) (0.021) 
Nonwhite 0.021** 0.031** 0.031*** 
 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.011) 
Pell eligible 0.024** 0.033** 0.024*** 
 
(0.015) (0.047) (0.009) 
< 10 miles to CC 0.067*** 0.081*** 0.077*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Dillon & Smith (2017) 0.112*** 0.144*** 0.171*** 
 
(0.021) (0.008) (0.018) 
Female -0.006 0.000 -0.008 
 
(0.041) (0.032) (0.038) 
Nonwhite 0.029** 0.027*** 0.037*** 
 
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003) 
Pell eligible 0.031** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) 
< 10 miles to CC 0.049*** 0.076*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.010) 
N students 866 2,494 3,966 
Treated students on support 416 1,244 1,976 
Untreated students on 
support 
450 1,250 1,990 
Note: Sample limited to students enrolling immediately following high school. 
Treated students matched only to untreated students in neighboring counties. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates based on nearest neighbor matching. 
*** p < .01 
   ** p < .05 







Through this dissertation, I explore the effects of two state-sponsored financial aid 
programs on postsecondary undermatch, as well as the importance of being explicit about 
definitions of undermatch when discussing this issue. In Chapter 3, I apply five unique 
definitions of undermatch to one sample of students. I determine that estimates of undermatch 
among recent high school graduates in Tennessee range from 21 to 69 percent, depending on the 
definition applied. These dramatically different results lead to varied conclusions about how 
prevalent undermatch is in this state. In Chapter 4, I investigate undermatch among students who 
receive the General Assembly Merit Scholarship (GAMS), a merit scholarship awarded to the 
highest achieving students in the state. These students, particularly those who are nonwhite and 
low income, have an increased likelihood of undermatch relative to their peers who receive 
different scholarship aid. As above, the effects of the GAMS program on students’ probabilities 
of undermatch rely on the definition of undermatch applied. In Chapter 5, I determine that 
students who took up the Tennessee Achieves tuition-free community and technical college 
program (prior to its statewide expansion and rebranding as Tennessee Promise) have an 
increased probability of undermatching, compared to their non-treated peers, should undermatch 
be defined as attending a two-year institution when they were academically eligible to attend a 




Below, I discuss how the findings of each of these three studies contribute to the body of 
undermatch literature; fit within the theoretical frameworks presented in Chapter 2; and can be 
used to develop public policy in Tennessee and throughout the United States. I conclude with a 
discussion of opportunities for future research. 
Contribution to literature 
These three papers contribute to the body of undermatch literature in a number of ways. 
Chapter 3, which implements five unique definitions of undermatch to estimate the prevalence of 
undermatch in Tennessee, emphasizes that in order for research and conversations about 
undermatch to be comparable and useful, researchers must be very transparent about how they 
define what undermatch actually is. As some of the most often-cited studies of undermatch (i.e., 
Bowen, et al., 2009; Roderick, et al., 2008, 2009) employ very different methodologies and 
definitions to answer distinct research questions, the results of these studies are not comparable, 
and sometimes present a conflicting narrative about how widespread undermatch is among those 
entering higher education in the United States.    
 Chapters 4 and 5 related to the findings of many prior studies of undermatch, particularly 
with respect to the enrollment behavior of nonwhite and lower income students (i.e., Fry, 2002; 
Alon & Tienda, 2005; Bowen, et al., 2009; Roderick, et al., 2008, 2009; Smith et al., 2013; 
Dillon & Smith, 2017; Rodriguez, forthcoming). The findings presented in these two chapters, 
which investigate the effects of the General Assembly Merit Scholarship and Tennessee 
Achieves programs, respectively, provide further evidence that students of color and those who 
are lower income (Pell-eligible) who are GAMS recipients or took up Tennessee Achieves have 
an increased probability of undermatch, relative to their white or middle/upper income peers, 
irrespective of the definition of undermatch applied.  
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It is worth noting that the majority of college-goers (63 percent) in Tennessee are white, 
as are the majority of GAMS recipients (70 percent) and Tennessee Achieves (74 percent) 
participants (Tennessee Higher Education Commission, 2016). As such, researchers and 
policymakers in Tennessee must be keenly aware of the enrollment decisions of typically 
underrepresented students entering higher education, and, more specifically, GAMS and 
Tennessee Achieves (now Tennessee Promise) recipients. These students have much to gain 
from enrolling in a selective institution (i.e., Dale & Krueger, 2002, 2014) and must be supported 
to ensure that they enroll at colleges and universities that are the best match for them. 
Theoretical frameworks 
Human capital theory 
As outlined in Chapter 2, human capital theory is very relevant to studies of undermatch. 
Becker (1993) asserts that it is not only the quantity of education in which a student invests, but 
also the quality that influences his lifetime earnings. Students who attend higher education 
institutions that are less selective and of lower quality than those they are academically eligible to attend, 
therefore, may not be optimally investing in their own human capital. While these students may be acting 
rationally in the short term (i.e., maximizing their utility by attending an institution that is lower cost, has 
desired programs of study, is closer to home, etc.) they may do themselves a long-term economic 
disservice by attending a less selective college or university.  
 An important next step in this research is to explore the degree completion and workforce 
outcomes of undermatched students in Tennessee, particularly those who received GAMS awards or were 
Tennessee Achieves (or Tennessee Promise) students. Tennessee has a robust P-20W data system that 
allows researchers to track students through higher education into the workforce. To expand upon the 
findings presented in this dissertation, these data can be used to determine whether students who 
152 
 
undermatched are underemployed or are earning low wages upon entering the workforce, as compared to 
their peers who attended more selective institutions at which they were well-matched (or overmatched).  
College choice models 
This set of papers reinforces a number of conclusions from the college choice theory and 
literature presented in Chapter 2. Considering Hossler and Gallagher’s (1987) three-stage model 
of college choice, students’ search process (the second stage of this model) often leads to 
undermatch, as many students are not seeking information about higher education institutions at 
which they would be well-matched. Instead, they are gathering information about and applying 
to colleges and universities that are close to home, institutions with which they are familiar, or at 
which they know peers and high school classmates (Roderick et al., 2008, 2009). Or, students 
who receive GAMS awards, for example, may be limiting their search to institutions that are in-
state, such that they may use their merit aid awards. To prevent undermatch due to 
misinformation or lacking information, students must be supported by counselors, teachers, and 
other school and community personnel to seek information – how to apply for both admission 
and financial aid, for example - about institutions at which they would be well-matched. 
 This need for support is particularly relevant in Tennessee, as the Tennessee Achieves 
program has now expanded statewide. Tennessee Promise, the now-statewide free community 
and technical college program, is very heavily promoted, which may adversely affect students’ 
information-seeking about the higher education option most appropriate for them.
29
 While the 
intention of these media campaigns is to attract students for whom higher education seems out of 
reach into community and technical colleges across the state (THEC, 2016), an unforeseen 
consequence may be that students who would be well-matched at a four-year (selective) college 
                                                             
29
 There was much media coverage and publicity when Tennessee Achieves expanded to each of 
the 27 counties as well, but nothing like the online, radio, television and print campaigns that 
have accompanied the rollout of the Tennessee Promise program over the past two years.  
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or university are suspending their college searches and choosing to enroll in a less-than-four year 
institution as a Tennessee Promise student. Perna’s (2006) theory of college choice is applicable 
to this discussion as well. This is a clear example of how the state policy context (Perna’s fourth 
layer) is effecting the information about college-going provided to students in their schools and 
communities (Perna’s second layer), potentially leading to less well-matched enrollment 
decisions.  
Implications for policy 
Undermatch in Tennessee 
High achieving students with an increased likelihood of undermatch (i.e., nonwhite and 
lower income students) should be identified as early as possible, and be supported through their 
college search and application processes. The Tennessee College Access and Success Network, a 
nonprofit organization that promotes college access across the state, has recently partnered with 
UBS Financial Services to intervene in low performing high schools in Tennessee to do just that. 
High performing students in these schools will have access to mentors, nudges (i.e., text 
messaging), and additional resources (i.e., college visits to selective institutions) to ensure that 
their college search process includes institutions at which they would be well-matched. This 
collaboration is interesting, as it addresses undermatch directly, as opposed to treating 
undermatch as a symptom or unintended consequence of another initiative. If this program 
succeeds in reducing undermatch among treated students, there is much opportunity to expand 
this intervention to additional schools statewide to impact as many additional high achieving, 
nonwhite and/or low income students as possible.  
 Further, improvements to college counseling and advising will substantially decrease 
students’ probabilities of undermatching. As college counselors are often stretched thin or are 
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responsible for students at multiple high schools, the state of Tennessee has established 
AdviseTN (“Advise Tennessee”), a corps of college counselors placed in forty of the most 
underserved high schools across the state. These counselors are charged with helping students 
with the college search and application processes as early as their sophomore years, and, among 
other responsibilities, helping students to seek information and make postsecondary choices that 
are appropriately aligned with their academic abilities. While AdviseTN is state-funded, and 
these college counselors are technically state employees, they have been trained and explicitly 
instructed to do a thorough college search with their students – not simply suggest that all 
students take advantage of the Tennessee Promise and enroll in a less-than-four-year institution. 
As this program is still in its infancy, there will be great opportunity for robust research about the 
outcomes and enrollment decisions of treated students in the next few years. 
 Finally, with regard to interactions with legislators and executive leadership in 
Tennessee, it is imperative that higher education advocates and researchers are very clear about 
what they mean when talking about undermatch. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, undermatch can 
be defined in a number of ways, each yielding a very different estimate that tells a dissimilar 
story about the prevalence of this issue. As such, transparency and clarity about what undermatch 
means will lead to much greater political support when combatting this issue across Tennessee.  
GAMS program 
Though the majority of higher education policymakers in Tennessee are currently 
focused on the role of the community and technical colleges as a vehicle for college access 
across the state (i.e., the Tennessee Promise and Tennessee Reconnect programs), it is critical 
that they are also aware of the college search and enrollment decisions of the state’s highest 
achieving students. Based on the findings of Chapter 4 of this dissertation, it is clear that these 
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students, particularly those who are nonwhite or lower income, lack the support and information 
necessary to attend highly selective, academically appropriate institutions.  
These high achieving students require support throughout the college search process, just 
as their lower achieving peers do (i.e., Roderick et al., 2008, 2009). It is critical, therefore, that 
college and guidance counselors are prepared to provide information and support, just as they 
would to those students on the margin of enrolling in higher education at all. As discussed above, 
this is a role that AdviseTN advisors will play; not promoting only state-sponsored programs, but 
working with high achieving students to determine the institutions that are the best fit – public, 
private, in-state or out-of-state. 
Tennessee Achieves (Tennessee Promise) 
As mentioned above, high school guidance and college counselors must be strategic 
about the students to whom they advocate participating in Tennessee Promise. Tennessee 
Promise should not be encouraged uniformly across all student subgroups: those who would be 
better-matched at a four-year institution should be encouraged and supported to seek information 
about and apply to these institutions. Students on the margin of not attending college at all 
should be the first order priority for these counselors and mentors/community members when 
making recommendations about Tennessee Promise.    
Additionally, it is critical that students who enroll in community or technical colleges as 
Tennessee Promise students are able to transfer seamlessly into a four-year institution, should 
they so choose. This is particularly true for students who took advantage of tuition-free 
community or technical college when they were academically eligible to have attended a four-
year institution. While the state of Tennessee has established structured Transfer Pathways, 
subject-specific articulation agreements between community colleges and four-year public 
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universities, they are not always honored and/or implemented with fidelity. This fact, coupled 
with an upcoming change in public higher education governance in Tennessee, emphasizes the 
need for explicit policies around transfer, and accountability measures to ensure that these 
policies are being executed as intended.  
Directions for future research 
Transfer behavior among undermatched students 
It is imperative that policymakers and education researchers in Tennessee understand 
transfer behavior in this state, particularly in light of the Tennessee Promise program. Students 
who undermatch by attending a community or technical college as a result of this program may 
transfer to a four-year college or university upon completing (or before) a technical certificate or 
an Associate’s degree. It is important to understand the point in time at which these transfers 
occur, as well as students’ time to a Bachelor’s degree – do they experience the “community 
college penalty” because they began their higher education experience at a community or 
technical college? Further, students who undermatch by attending less selective, lower quality 
four-year colleges and universities may transfer to more selective four-year institutions, both in- 
and out-of-state. By using both the THEC Student Information System and data provided by the 
National Student Clearinghouse to investigate the timing and direction of these transfers, 
policymakers in Tennessee will better understand the ways in which undermatch influences 
student outcomes.  
Workforce outcomes 
As one of the most often-cited arguments for addressing undermatch is the economic 
return (i.e., lifetime earnings) to attending a selective postsecondary institution, an important 
next step in higher education research in Tennessee is to explore the workforce outcomes of 
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undermatched students. Workforce outcomes – including the field in which a student is 
employed, whether the student is underemployed, and his wages/salary – will likely differ by the 
definition of undermatch applied, which in itself could be an interesting study. As mentioned 
above, Tennessee has a robust P-20W data system that allows researchers to determine the 
workforce outcomes of those who graduated from both public and private higher education 
institutions in Tennessee, to begin to determine their post-higher education economic well-being.  
Changes to financial aid programs 
With the announcement of the Tennessee Promise is 2014, many existing state-funded 
financial aid programs were modified to fund this ambitious statewide tuition-free college 
program. Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship awards (including the GAMS award), for 
example, were repackaged such that students did not receive the same amount of aid each year. 
Students enrolled at four-year institutions received $500 less during their first two years and an 
additional $500 during their Junior and Senior years. While the total award amount over four 
years was unchanged, the disbursement of the funds differed. It is important that higher 
education researchers begin to examine the effects of these changes, particularly as related to 
undermatch. Students for whom $500 is a nontrivial amount of scholarship aid (i.e., low income 
students) are those who are more likely to undermatch. Therefore, it is important to determine 
how this change in the packaging of TELS awards (among other state aid programs) influences 
students’ enrollment decisions, especially for those students who belong to subgroups with 
historically high rates of undermatch.  
Conclusion 
 Tennessee has over the past few years been at the forefront of many important higher 
education innovations. For this reason, it is a very exciting place to work as a higher education 
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researcher, and there is ample opportunity to explore the effects of these innovative statewide 
programs on student outcomes. It is critical, however, that these initiatives are investigated and 
evaluated with regard to student match: how are these innovations affecting students’ enrollment 
decisions, particularly among high achieving students? This dissertation – which explores the 
importance of clear definitions of undermatch and determines the effects of two state-sponsored 
financial aid programs on undermatch – is only the tip of the iceberg. Additional research must 
be done to determine the most appropriate ways to ensure that students in Tennessee have access 
to the higher education institutions at which they are best-matched, where they will be most 
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